During the night of 26-27 March 1941, a group of Yugoslav air force and army officers carried out an almost bloodless coup that overthrew the Regency of Prince Paul. King Peter II (1923-1970) was declared to be of age and a new broadly based government was formed under the premiership of General Simovich, the leader of the revolution. This essay examines briefly the foreign and domestic policy of the short-lived Simovich government until April 6, when the Axis attack on Yugoslavia swept everything before it.

The coup was triggered by Yugoslavia’s accession to the Tripartite Pact, two days earlier in Vienna, and has been characterised as ‘an emotional reaction, an outburst of anger against an alliance that went against Serbs’ feelings, historical memories and traditions’.*1 Consequently, the first and most important problem was the question of war or peace with the Axis. Also, it should be kept in mind that the domestic circumstances had played a major role in the signing of the Pact. The Croats and Slovenes were generally in favour of peace at any cost since involvement in a war and Serbian nationalism could threaten the Sporazum of 1939 and the fragile relationship between the nationalities of the kingdom.*2 So, the issue of national unity under the new reality imposed by the coup was another serious problem for the Simovich government. The Serb population throughout the country greeted the change with demonstrations and slogans like ‘better war than the Pact, better a grave than a slave; there can be no war without the Serbs’.*3 In Slovenia, the enthusiasm and the demonstrations were less massive and in Croatia there was little popular support for the revolt. Most Croats thought that the whole story was a purely Serbian affair which might be finally directed against the Sporazum. In other words, in Serbia there was a strong anti-Pact movement but the Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims did not seem to be committed to the same cause.*4 Faced with this confusing situation of external danger and domestic division the successful rebels tried to form a government and work out a policy.

A German intelligence report on March 31 pointed out the dilemma of Simovich who ‘was too wise to take an anti-Axis course and too weak to ask from the people and perhaps the officer corps a policy [of co-operation] with Germany and Italy’.*5 Simovich was forced by the circumstances to play on two fronts. In order to secure the participation of the Croats in the government he had to accept both the Sporazum and the Tripartite Pact; Machek, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, had put these conditions and they were finally met.*6 However, the acceptance of such conditions - at least in theory - cancelled the obvious aim of the Serb officers who supported the revolution; furthermore, it left no possibilities to those Serb nationalists who wished to deny the concessions made to the Croats with the Sporazum.*7 On the other hand, it appeared to Machek that ‘Simovich wanted to enter war at all cost’.*8

After several days of discussions, the new cabinet of Premier Simovich met for the first time on April 5 and it can be said that it was politically the most representative since the creation of Yugoslavia. At those difficult days the effort to achieve political unity seemed necessary but at the same time this action undermined the original plans of the rebels and rendered the unity of thinking and purpose virtually impossible. For example, six members of the government, including Simovich, appeared to be strongly anti-Axis while the Vice-Premier Machek and eight other ministers wished to preserve first of all peace and good relations with the Axis. Between those opposing groups stood the remaining seven members of the new cabinet.*9 At any rate, this first official meeting was rather useless since all the crucial issues had been examined earlier, although some crucial decisions had not really been taken.

According to Colonel Kljakovich:

Not even two days after the execution of the coup, it became clear to the Simovich government that the new friends (Great Britain and the United States) were unable to do anything efficacious in favour of Yugoslavia, while on the other hand the provoked rejected allies (Germany and Italy) possessed great strength. Between these two poles the government was unable to find a solution of its own. Now each of its acts was carefully weighed in order not to cause reproach on either side, and this became the essence of its foreign policy.*10

Indeed, Simovich tried to gain time playing again on two fronts. On March 27 he assured the German envoy in Belgrade that his government would continue the same policy towards Germany and claimed that the coup was only a matter of internal politics.*11 Similar statements were handed to the German military attach? by another leader of the coup, General Mirkovich. Furthermore, on March 30 the new foreign minister declared that Yugoslavia would respect all international obligations, including of course the accession to the Tripartite Pact.*12 Finally, it was decided that Vice-Premier Jovanovich should meet Mussolini in Italy and the foreign minister should leave for Germany and discuss matters with Hitler. Yet, these meetings never took place.*13

It was obvious that the new government was trying desperately to appease the Axis. Simovich delayed mobilisation and generally made ineffectual military preparations hoping to avoid an additional offence to Hitler and demonstrating at times a rather naive confidence. King Peter was told by the Premier on March 28 that there will be enough time for mobilisation later and after all ‘we do not wish to show any fear of war already, nor do we wish to provoke the Axis powers’.*14 It was not until April 4 that Simovich finally gave orders for a secret mobilisation but it was too late. King Peter also claims that he had warned Simovich and the minister of war about the date of the German invasion but they emphatically replied that ‘the Germans had the best intentions, that we had signed the Pact, that our neutrality was guaranteed, and so on. *15

In the meantime, the Yugoslav government had made another attempt to strengthen its diplomatic position by seeking closer friendship with the Soviet Union. This effort was successful but completely meaningless, as it would be soon proven. On April 4 the German ambassador in Moscow was informed by foreign minister Molotov that Yugoslavia and USSR were about to sign a treaty of non-aggression and friendship; moreover, Molotov insisted that Yugoslavia’s new rulers should not be regarded as anti-Axis by the Reich. One day later, the treaty was signed in Moscow. Yet, the Soviet Union did absolutely nothing to protect Yugoslavia when the Germans invaded.*16 Although the Simovich government appeared trying by all means not to provoke the Axis, it had also contacts with the British and the Greeks in order to acquire as much as possible help in a future war with Germany and Italy. However, the Yugoslav side was indecisive and avoided to commit itself. On March 31, a British mission under the Chief of the Imperial Staff met in Belgrade with Simovich. The British had ambitious plans and seemed to have overestimated not only Yugoslavia’s military strength but also the will and the ability of the government to involve the kingdom into a war against the Axis. The British suggested that Yugoslavia should immediately take part in combined operations against the Italians in Albania and help Greece in case it was attacked by Germany first. Simovich, although he had also overestimated the strength of the British forces in Greece, rejected the proposal since he did not want to put his country in such a risk even if it was not attacked. Further staff talks took place in the Greek border city of Florina. The excessive demands of the Yugoslav military and the discovery that only limited assistance could be obtained by the British and the Greeks unavoidably led to the failure of the negotiations. Churchill’s pressure did not bring any results and by April 5 Simovich was convinced that it was not worth while to make plans of co-operation with the Anglo-Greek forces. In addition, he imagined that the Germans would not be able to attack for the time being while Yugoslavia would be fully prepared to resist an invasion in two weeks time.*17

It is difficult to explain why Simovich appeared to be so optimistic about the military capabilities of the kingdom since as a general he was fully aware of the poor state of the Yugoslav armed forces. King Peter had noted in autumn 1940 after several inspection tours:

The work I had seen seemed to be proceeding too slowly and to be based on old-fashioned plans and designs. Methods in army training camps were out of date too...the men were lamentably equipped and there was hardly any motorisation of the forces...only a few of our troops had the modern field radio.*18

At the time of the Axis invasion, Yugoslavia had about 700,000 troops available but more than 400,000 of them were under arms less than a month and virtually untrained. Not a single division was ready for action and not one unit was manned according to its planned wartime strength. The postponement of mobilisation had made things worse and when orders were finally given many men simply ignored them;*19 furthermore there was disaffection among some Croat units. Last but not least, the bad positioning of the units and a hopeless strategic plan, which aimed at defending the whole borders instead of concentrating in the centre and south mountainous areas, eliminated all prospects for successful resistance.*20

In conclusion, the problems that the Simovich government had to face were far beyond its capabilities; it tried to manoeuvre but under such internal and external pressure this effort was doomed. In fact, the revolution cancelled itself since it was forced by the circumstances to follow the domestic and international policies of the regime it had overthrown. It seems that the only thing the revolution achieved was to save the Serb self-esteem.*21 The new government did not have the time and the ability to consolidate its position, prepare the country for war and preserve the integrity of the kingdom; on the other hand, the Axis was determined and able to crush an unreliable and divided Yugoslavia. As Tomasevich wrote: ‘ The weakness of the Yugoslav army in manpower, transportation facilities and supplies were compounded by lack of cohesion and unity of views and purpose among government leaders, leaders of the armed forces, and the population at large’.*22 On April 6, the German bombs falling on Belgrade signalled tragically the failure of the Simovich government.

NOTES

1 A. Djilas, p.137.
2 S. Pavlowitch, pp. 102-3; F. Singleton, p. 173.
3 M. Wheeler, p. 54.
4 Djilas, pp. 136-7; Singleton, pp. 174-5.
5 J. Tomasevich, p. 45. 
6 Peter II, p. 73; Tomasevich,  p. 48.
7 H. Seton-Watson, p. 66; Wheeler, p. 54.
8 Tomasevich, p. 48.
9 Tomasevich, pp. 48-9.
10 Tomasevich, p. 50.
11 Peter II, p. 71.
12 Tomasevich, pp. 50-1.
13 Peter II, p. 73.
14 Peter II,  pp. 72-4; Tomasevich, pp. 51-2.
15 Peter II, pp. 74-5.
16 Seton-Watson, pp. 66-7.
17 Wheeler, pp. 56-9.
18 Peter II, p. 56.
19 Tomasevich, p. 64.
20 S. Clissold p. 206; Peter II p. 74.
21 Wheeler, p. 54.
22 Tomasevich, p. 63.