While Cicero approached Rome at the beginning of January 49, the senate agreed that Caesar would be declared a public enemy if he did not relinquish his proconsular command of Gaul. On the night of January 11, Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, the river that divided Cisalpine Gaul and Italy. A day after the civil war had begun Cicero had these words for Tiro:

I arrived outside Rome on January 4. Nothing could have been a greater compliment than the way people came out to meet me. But I found the city inflamed with civil discord, or rather with civil war, and when I wanted to heal the wounds, as I think I could have done, I came up against the ambitions of particular individuals; for on both sides there are people who actually want to fight. (Fam. 16.11.2)

In the weeks that followed, Cicero tried to be a mediator between Pompeians and Caesarians, informing Tiro (Fam. 16.12.2): "Ever since I reached the area of Rome I have not ceased my efforts to further concordia by thought, word, and deed." He was criticised for this middle-of-the-road approach and was amazed that the boni, the well-disposed men of principle, actually yearned to engage in a civil war with the improbi, those who dishonoured the republic. But the senate was unprepared for war and the majority (i.e. those loyal to Pompey and the republican cause) including the consuls, C. Marcellus and L. Lentulus, fled Rome and its environs in a panic (Fam. 16.12). To Cicero's dismay, Pompey also left and retreated to Roman Calabria with his army. But not before he entrusted Cicero to take over the military governorship of the Campanian coast which he accepted, stationing himself at Formiae for a few months. In the meantime some members of Caesar's faction tried to sway Cicero from his Pompeian sympathies. But he kept his neutrality solid, informing Atticus that he was in constant contact with Caesar and Pompey and always urging both generals to come to some agreement or pact, described as concordia (Att. 8.2.1).

The brief letters exchanged between Pompey and Cicero (at the behest of Caesar) are not as cordial as one would expect. In February, two quite uncomplimentary notes from Pompey urge Cicero to join him at Luceria on the 10th (Att. 8.11A), then Brundisium on the 20th (Att. 8.11C). Cicero's extensive and very courteous answers fail to fulfill expectations. Pompey is assured of his friend's expressed intention to join him but Cicero has reasons for delaying and thus avoiding a meeting entirely (Att. 8.11D.1): "It did not enter my mind that in the state's interests you would be going overseas. I was in high hopes that we should succeed either in establishing concordia, which appeared to me the most expedient course, or in honourably defending the state in Italy" (cf. Att. 8.11B).

By the end of February, great anxiety had overwhelmed Cicero as to how to deal with the rift between Pompey and Caesar. In a state of uneasiness, he asks Atticus for a certain book on the topic of harmony from one of his Greek associates: "I remember a book On Homonoia brought to you by Demetrius of Magnesia, dedicated to yourself. Would you kindly send it to me? You see what sort of position I am considering" (Att. 8.11.7). The next day, another letter is sent to Atticus seeking his trusted advice in this whole situation. The feeling of uncertainty as to how Cicero can best serve his beloved republic is monumental, and the state of affairs causes him incredible indecision begging the question: "Is a peacemaking role required or does all rest with the warrior?" Almost in an act of desperation, he insistently demands, yet again, for a copy of the book on a subject he so cherished: "As I wrote to you earlier, please send me the book Demetrius of Magnesia dedicated to you about concordia" (Att. 8.12.6). While Cicero was obviously eager to acquire a current Greek point of view, it is not known in what way this book was beneficial since it seems to have been returned immediately by mid-March, with barely a comment (Att. 9.9.2). An idea of the book's contents may be gathered from earlier publications on concordia by notable Greek individuals.

The factious hostilities in and among Greek states during the fifth and fourth centuries BC led to erudite admiration for homonoia among notable Athenian orators and philosophers who reflected on how the spread of sedition seriously threatened any attempt at Greek unity. Political agreement between the members of communities was an ongoing struggle due to constant internecine wars. Thucydides describes the dangerous effects of discord (stasis) as fanatical aggression which overpowers democratic and oligarchic leaders alike, causing suspicion and extreme urgency in everyone (3.82-83).

In Athens, the two factions, oligarchs and democrats, were always struggling for power and each thought its system of government was superior to the other. Homonoia was always seen as the product of the democrats. Yet, even the oligarchs practised homonoia, for even their rule needed agreement and unity to exist. The overthrow of the four hundred member oligarchy in 411 restored the democrats and re-established homonoia (Thuc. 8.93). Differences were settled among opposing members and civil disturbances subsided temporarily until 404. In this year, the Delian League crumbled as Athens capitulated under Sparta's dominance and endured an oligarchy of thirty tyrants. The onset of discord revealed the breakdown of communal spirit and the appeal for homonoia resulted in the tyrants' brief rule which ended in 403 when democracy was once again restored.

During this period, Lysias and Andocides described the conditions that reunited Athens under homonoia. Citizenship rights and property rights, that were taken away by the oligarchs were important aspects of the internal harmony of the city and civic life. A city prospered only if homonoia was preserved by the generosity, wisdom, self-control and devotion of its citizens (Lys. Dem. 20, And. Mys. 140). Discord existed at Athens when the oligarchs ruled and the opposition democrats suffered "atimia" and exile. When the exiles were welcomed back and the disenfranchised citizens reinstated, the struggle for peace and freedom was achieved (Mys. 106-7).

Plato (c. 429-347) provided a speculative outlook in his philosophy regarding homonoia. He examined how goodness, justice, friendship, and legislation are key elements for harmony to exist in the city-state. But since citizens always had opposing opinions on methods toward achieving homonoia then disagreements were good so long as discussions did not develop into factional conflicts (Alc. 127d; Cleit. 409e, 410a-b; Resp. 1.351c-e, 4.432a-b, 8.545c-d, 8.554c-e; Plt. 260b, 311a-c; Leg. 703c, 4.708d, 759b; Phdr. 237d, 256b, 263a).

Plato disapproved of war and described it as an unnatural existence (Resp. 5.470c-d). He saw it as an illness that created an imbalance within the harmonia of a political body,[1] and described it more as "dissension" rather than "sedition" (Leg. 5.774d). War puts injustice in the place of justice and friendship, factors which provide order in a state (Resp. 1.351d, 1.352a). He writes: "There is no greater evil for a state than for one to divide it and make it into many, and no greater good than for someone to unify it and keep it whole" (Resp. 5.462b-c). Basically, unity brings stability. Once a state is divided into many parts there can be no possibility for a common unity or sharing between those parts. In his opinion, a body of individuals living as members of a community must make their services available to fellow members of that community in order for it to grow (Prt. 322b; Resp. 2.369b-d). In this way the society develops an inherent or natural social connection (Leg. 3.678ff; Pol. 301e-302b), kindness, and common heritage (Resp. 5.470f; Leg. 4.708c-d; Menex. 237b-238b).

Both Demosthenes (384-322) and Isocrates (436-338) independently sought practical and strategic solutions for implementing and enforcing homonoia in order to keep Athens strong. Threats from neighbouring states, Persia, and a growing military influence by Philip of Macedon kept the two orators busy in their political endeavours.

As a prosecutor, Demosthenes was concerned with internal homonoia and its civic importance to the public. The Athenian habits in winning rights by free debate, honouring the constitution, agreeing with the laws, and cancelling unjustified debts all created harmony. In this way, Athens was more prosperous than other city-states. Since the Spartans and the Thebans did not honour justice as the Athenians did, then their brand of homonoia was inferior (Lept. 11-13, 108-110; Andr. 76-78).

In the Philippics, Demosthenes' struggle against the so-called barbarian Philip of Macedon in 341 allowed the orator to promote the strategic importance of a homonoia among Greek states against a common enemy. The envy, contempt, pardon, hatred, and bribery that were imported into Greece had ruined society (3.39). Philip had become a menace causing disunion and corruption. The message was clear: homonoia could not be bought by the invader (3.38). Demosthenes successfully convinced his fellow Athenian citizens to persuade all Greek states to suspend their differences and battle together in a common cause against Philip. A national state of homonoia was created in order to preserve and protect the unique civic harmony of individual Greek states. The Hellenic League was formed. But the Greek alliance did not continue after a defeat at Chaeronea in 338.

Cicero's determination in the promotion of concordia is comparable to the consistency in which the concept appears in the works of one of the Greek orators he most admired, namely Isocrates (De Or. 2.10; Brut. 32). This eloquent writer expressed an unwavering loyalty in his continual longing for goodness, justice, and homonoia. His speeches and treatises provide a clear view of the political history of Greece.

After ten years of composition, Isocrates published the Panegyricus in 380. With Athens at the helm, he championed the cause of homonoia among the Greeks for the purpose of war against the barbarian Persians. Only this way could Athens regain its lost supremacy. Athens was so weakened after its defeat in the war against the allies in 355 that Isocrates then advocated a return to a more sober constitution in which the Areopagus would exercise its ancient general supervision over all aspects of society.[2] This was actually a plea for the restricted form of democracy of Solon. In his appeal for a just and orderly government of the people, he claims that it is the spirit of fairness among citizens that brings society into homonoia and advances the power of the city (Areop. 68-70). Only with internal homonoia strengthened can Athens strive for leadership over Greece by persuading fellow Greeks that homonoia is a noble cause for war against the Persians (Antid. 36-37). Against the wishes of Demosthenes, Isocrates attempted to convince Philip to unite Greece against the Persians (Phil. 16, 39-41, 141). And, in a last attempt to promote the cause of panhellenism, the Panathenaicus, written in 339 extolled the principles of homonoia. But the Greeks did not heed the call. Philip had his own schemes, defeated them the following year and became undisputed master of the Greek world.

While Demetrius' book On Concordia was in Cicero's possession he admitted to Atticus that his incapacity to make concrete decisions at this crucial time was due to his intellectual superiority: "the underlying causes of events always affect me more than the events themselves" (Att. 9.5.2: March 10). Elsewhere, he further stated: "But not to abandon myself wholly to grief, I have taken certain subjects as themes, as it were, which bear on politics and the present times" (Att. 9.4.1). One of these themes is of course provided by Demetrius' book, which leads him to ponder matters in Greek:

Ought a man to remain in his country under a tyrant? Ought he to strive for the overthrow of a tyrant at all costs, even if the existence of the state is going to be endangered thereby?...Ought he to use reasoning rather than arms to save his country under a tyrant? Should a statesman live quietly in retirement while his country is ruled by a tyrant or should he take every risk for freedom's sake?...These are the questions in which I exercise myself, debating the pros and cons now in Greek now in Latin. (Att. 9.4.2)

After relating these thoughts to the fact that the spirit and passion for peace negotiations must be followed by proper action from the highest officials in the state, Cicero is appalled that the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius Marcellus deserted the capital and so did nothing in this regard. Also, Pompey's immense naval mobilisation in order to secure command of the Mediterranean filled Cicero with anger and sadness (Att. 9.9.2): "This whole fleet is being collected from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, Miletus, Cos, in order to cut off supplies from Italy and occupy the grain-growing provinces."

As a result, within two weeks Demetrius' book was promptly returned to Atticus (Att. 9.9.2).[3] He questioned his allegiance and a sense of betrayal toward his country came over him: "Was I, whom some have called the parent and saviour of this city, to lead troops of Getae and Armenians and Colchians against her? Was I to bring famine upon my fellow citizens and devastation upon Italy?" (Att. 9.10.3).[3]

Such a contemplation about the need to take arms at this moment was instigated by the many people who addressed Cicero as imperator in their correspondence.[4] One such individual was L. Balbus whose citizenship Cicero had defended seven years earlier. Acting outwardly in a neutral way, though he was Caesar's financial agent at Rome, he urged Cicero to carry on with his efforts of reconciliation: "I beg you, dear Cicero, put your thoughts and concern upon a plan well worthy of your noble character, I mean bringing back Caesar and Pompey to their former harmony [in pristinam concordiam]" (Att. 8.15A.1). Balbus also tries to persuade the orator to join Caesar's camp (Att. 8.15A.1-3), as does Mark Antony (Att. 10.8A). Cicero's allegiance would have been valuable since whatever course he took would probably be followed by all the undecided senators and politicians.

Even Caesar addressed Cicero as imperator in a subsequent note and beckoned him to Rome immediately to seek his counsel, influence, position, and assistance in a further attempt to secure his support, or at least neutrality (Att. 9.6A). Balbus continued to write on Caesar's behalf, confident that only Cicero could contribute to the restoration of harmony between the two generals:

From this [copy of Caesar's letter] you will see how anxious he is to restore harmony [concordiam reconciliare] with Pompey and how far removed from any sort of cruelty. I am of course very pleased that these are his views. As regards yourself and your sentiments of loyalty and gratitude, I feel exactly as you do, my dear Cicero, that your reputation and duty do not allow of your bearing arms against one from whom you give out that you have received so great a service. (Att. 9.7B.1; cf. Phil. 2.24)

It is evident that some sort of agreement had to be sought between the two generals in order to avert civil war and people were counting on Cicero to call the meeting between Caesar and Pompey that never was. About March 20, Cicero responded to Caesar's earlier request for advice and showed enthusiasm for peace negotiations:

However, hope led me towards the notion that, as suits the wisdom which you possess in so admirable and exceptional a degree, you might be desirous in instituting negotiations for tranquillity, peace, and civic harmony [de otio, de pace, de concordia civium]; and I conceived myself to be by nature and public image not ill fitted to help in such an undertaking. (Att. 9.11A.1)

But Pompey still had to be swayed to return to Rome for one meeting to take place privately and another before the senate for the sake of civic harmony. Cicero continues his plea but rather than merely asking, he begs and implores Caesar:

To spare amid your grave preoccupations some time to consider how by your kindness I may meet the claims of honour, gratitude, and loyalty in the remembrance of a single obligation. Even if my request concerned only myself I should hope that from you I should obtain it; but I believe it concerns both your honour and the public welfare that I, as a friend of peace and of you both, should through you be retained as the most appropriate agent for restoring the harmony between you two and of our fellow-citizens [ad vestram et ad civium concordiam]. (Att. 9.11A.3)

Caesar was already on his way to Rome to convene a senate meeting and arrived April 1, but not before he made a scheduled stop at Formiae to have a private meeting with Cicero. Since Pompey had already left Italy for Greece a week before, nothing decisive was accomplished as Cicero told Atticus (Att. 9.18; cf. Att. 9.16). Since no reconciliation was imminent Cicero did not find it necessary to attend Caesar's senate meeting. His decision not to attend was also due to the fact that three hundred of the nobler and more influential Roman senators, including both consuls, were already with Pompey at Thessalonica. Their support ensured that Pompey was representing true senatorial interests and defending the republican cause.

At Rome, in the presence of hundreds of partisan senators (at least enough to establish a quorum), Caesar expressed his intention for the restoration of pax et concordia and proposed to send messengers to Pompey to negotiate a settlement (Cass. Dio 41.15.4; cf. 41.16.4 ). Expectations were not trifling, since at some point during the year two of Caesar's loyal followers, Decimus Iunius Brutus and C. Vibius Pansa, issued coins with a representation of two clasped hands, the symbol of concordia.[5] He promoted a new policy termed nova ratio vincendi in which he pledged to treat the vanquished with extraordinary generosity (Att. 9.7C.1). But before dealing with his rival personally, Caesar proceeded to Spain to defeat the Pompeians at Ilerda (Att. 10.4.8).

One individual who was present at Caesar's senate meeting was Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the moderate consul of 51 who resisted the extreme policies of his colleague M. Marcellus.[6]Famous as a jurisconsult, he was considered a man of peace with great sanctity of character (Cicero eulogized him in the Ninth Philippic). In a letter to his friend dated April 28 Cicero explains his plan to leave Italy. He reveals that, although their intentions were honourable, they both had made a mistake (error fuit) in the direction of their policy. Cicero is not clear about what they should have done besides advising for harmony and a peaceful reconciliation between the two generals:[7]

You assume a close connection between your cause and mine; well, we were certainly both guilty of a like mistake, though our sentiments were most loyal. For whatever the policy of each of us, what we had in view was harmony [consilia ad concordiam spectaverunt], and as there was nothing more to the advantage of Caesar himself, we imagined that we were even earning his gratitude by our advocacy of peace. How greatly we have been deceived, and to what a pass things have come, you can see for yourself. (Fam. 4.2.3)

At this point Cicero had failed in his efforts as mediator and he was ready to give up and retire (Att. 9.10.3). He had put his hopes in Pompey but developed grave reservations about the general: sullaturit, "He is playing at being Sulla" (Att. 9.10.6). Pompey's desire to imitate his one-time mentor was repeated a few more times: Att. 9.10.2, 9.11.3, 9.14.1; cf. Q. Fr. 3.4.1 where there was a concern that Pompey may have aimed at tyranny. Caesar's attitude was just as menacing. Curio had reported that Caesar had no intention of continuing the res publica (Att. 10.4.9): "[Caesar] hates the senate. 'Everything shall come from me,' is his motto". It was also revealed that the policy of nova ratio vincendi was implemented to render Caesar more popular but would not relax his cruelty if he lost the public's favour (Att. 10.4.8). Cicero was already led to believe that (Att. 8.11.2): "Both aimed at personal domination, not the happiness and fair fame of society".

Concordia was not a topic in Cicero's correspondence for the next four years (that is, the duration of the civil war). After the battle of Ilerda, Caesar returned to Rome and was nominated dictator for eleven days in order to preside over the election of consuls. He took this opportunity to once again promote his nova ratio vincendi by carrying out three important measures: a compromise on the question of debts (the substantial justice of which is proved by Rufus' letter to Cicero, Fam. 8.17), amnesty to exiles under the acts of Pompey and Sulla, and full extension of citizens' rights to colonists of Novum Comum in Transpadane Gaul and Gades in Spain.[8] Cicero criticised and distrusted these acts of clementia (Att. 7.11.1, 10.8.2).

In the meantime, about June 11, 49, Cicero had already left for Greece (Fam. 14.7). The decision to support Pompey's senatorial forces and the "exiled" government was more in line with his policy to defend the republic than to remain in Italy under Caesar's revolutionary armies. He stayed in Thessalonica for quite a while (with many of the emigrated senators) and by May 48 joined Pompey's camp at Petra near Dyrrachium. He remained there until Pompey was defeated by Caesar at the decisive battle of Pharsalus on August 9 (Fam. 9.9; Att. 11.4). A month later, Pompey was treacherously murdered in Egypt. By early November, Cicero returned to Italy (Att. 11.5) but did not yet venture to Rome, while the civil war continued for three more years against other remaining Pompeian forces.