In early spring of 334 B.C.E., Alexander III, King of the Macedonians and master of all Greece, except Sparta, crossed the Hellespont and embarked upon a campaign that, in the end, would destroy the Persian empire and put the larger part of Asia Minor, the Middle East, and Central Asia under his control and the control of his subordinates. It was a massive achievement, rivaled in scope by few events throughout history. Without a doubt, Alexander possessed a significant amount of skill, but skill alone did not dictate his success. There are many factors that simply cannot be explained by citing genius. Instead, an analysis of preceding Greek political and military history is needed. An inquiry of this nature could easily fall into infinite reduction; for the sake of brevity, the scope of this essay will be limited to the origins of the animosity between the Greeks and Persians, the political disunity of the Greek cities, and the revisions in warfare during the two centuries preceding Alexander’s anabasis. The detail to which each of these issues will be explored will be limited to their relevance to the subject at hand, namely, the factors determining the feasibility of the Greek expedition into Persia and its success.

The idea to march into Persia was by no means a novel design by the latter half of the fourth century. Isocrates, the most vocal advocate of such an undertaking, refers in his Panegyricus to a number of orators who have preceded him in preaching this topic. To many, Persia was ripe for the picking: enormously wealthy but perilously weak. Adding to this sentiment was the long-standing animosity between Hellenes and Persians. This wasn’t merely a matter of Greek xenophobia: the proponents were giving voice to an issue that had plagued the Greeks for nearly two centuries. The problem began with the creation of the Persian empire during the middle of the sixth century.

Persia had been a minor subject of the Median Empire since the fall of the Assyrian Empire. Around 559, the king of Persia, Cyrus, incited his subjects to revolt against Median dominion, and within a decade he had secured their independence. The Persians continued to expand, and in 547 conquered Asia Minor. In doing so, Cyrus acquired ten Hellenic cities situated along the Aegean coast. These cities either capitulated or were crushed before the Persian onslaught. At the time, Cyrus probably gave little thought to this event. These cities were, after all, but a few on his ever expanding list of conquests. The Hellenes of Greece proper were not incredibly concerned either. Their cousins in Asia had previously been under the control of the Lydian king before the coming of Cyrus, and this was merely a shift in overlords, not a matter of oppressing a free people. Yet this event was to have far-reaching consequences, and can be considered the origin of the troubles that were to ensue.

Although the Ionic cities had appealed to Sparta for aid immediately after the coming of the Persians, no city of Greece was willing or able to assist them at that time. This hand changed by the end of the Sixth century, however, when the ruler of Miletus began courting Sparta and Athens for support with the rebellion he was fomenting. He realized that he needed a powerful ally, for the Greek cities of Asia Minor were notoriously weak. He traveled first to Sparta, but the prospect of such a long march into Asia (nearly three months) was repellant to their king, Cleomenes.(Herodotus V.50) Greek warfare was a very limited affair up to this point; the idea of total war, of the utter destruction of one’s enemy, did not exist. Conflict typically occurred over a few acres of farmland and tended to serve the psychological needs, rather than material, of those involved. Nor were they protracted affairs, for many Greek soldiers were professional farmers and had quite a bit to attend to, especially around the summer campaigning season. It simply wasn’t an option for a large portion of these men to grab their arms and campaign for a quarter of the year. The nature of Greek warfare prior to the Peloponnesian war was summed up by Hanson: “Greek hoplite battles were struggles between small landholders who by mutual consent sought to limit warfare (and hence killing) to a single, brief, nightmarish occasion.” (Hanson, 1989 p.4) This style of combat also served to keep Greece divided into thousands of independent city-states, for it did not allow for expansionism and the occupation of conquered territories.

The Spartans, however, did not fit this profile of farmer-warriors. They enjoyed the luxury, if it can so be called, of being professional soldiers due to their enslavement of the Messenians and the Laconians - entire peoples who were the property of the Spartan state. It is perhaps for this reason that the Milesian Aristagoras approached Cleomenes first. Yet, though their time in the field was not constrained by agricultural dictates, the Spartans were uneasy about leaving their homes for such a long period. The reluctance of Cleomenes was manifold: when the Spartan army left Greece, their noncombatants would be surrounded by a restless and hostile body of Helots, not to mention other rivalrous Greek cities; an overseas expedition had never been attempted by any single city, and only by the unified cities once, in legend; ultimately, the scheming nature of the Milesian probably did as much as the rest to dissuade the Spartans. Aristagoras was sent packing, and headed off towards Athens.

The people of the Greek cities in Asia thought of themselves as Ionians, kindred of the Athenians. Aristagoras certainly voiced this consanguinity in his appeal to Athens, which was the parent city of Miletus besides.(Herodotus I.143) The Athenian assembly was more receptive than Cleomenes had been, and offered twenty ships as aid. It should be noted that the banks of oarsmen needed to power these vessels were filled by the poorer segment of society: men who had little or no property and were not tied to the land for agricultural purposes. In this respect, it was easier to commit a fleet for a few months than to field an army for the same period of time. Regardless, this act was to have profound and long-lasting consequences, as Herodotus sums up well: These ships were the beginning of mischief both to the Greeks and to the barbarians. (Herodotus V.97)

The Ionian revolt, as it came to be known, ultimately ended poorly for the rebels despite a few early successes. One notable occurrence was the burning of Sardis, a city in Lydia that went up in flames after being captured by the rebels. The Persian temple of Cybele was destroyed in the conflagration, an act that later served to justify the burning of Greek temples during the Persian invasions, which in turn was used by Philip II to justify the invasion of Asia.

The Persian king at this time was Darius, who vowed revenge upon hearing of the Athenian donation. After dealing with the insurrection in Asia, he turned his sights westward, and in 490 sent an expeditionary force under the command of Datis and Artaphernes to Greece with the intent of punishing Athens and Eretria (which had sent five triremes to the rebels) for their collaboration in the revolt of the Ionic cities. The Persians sacked several cities, burned temples, and took hostages as the fleet made its way across the Aegean. When the fleet reached Eretria, the citizens put up a good fight, but fell due to treachery. After sacking the city, the Persians set sail for the Greek mainland and Athens.

Marathon lay a short distance across the channel from Eretria, and was a suitable place for battle, but a fairly long march to Athens. The Persians chose this place to make landfall, perhaps expecting the topography to give their cavalry an advantage over Greek infantry. The Athenians, upon hearing of the landing, sent a runner to Sparta to beg assistance while their main army marched to the coast to meet the threat. As the army approached Marathon, disagreement arose among the commanders as some, fearing the numerical superiority of the Persians, were reluctant to attack. After some persuasion, the general Miltiades convinced the leaders that to defer any longer would only harm them. This delay may have actually benefited the Greeks. Chester Starr, in his comprehensive account of the ancient world, posits the idea that the Persians may have tired of waiting, and sent their cavalry away by ship to land closer to Athens.(Starr p.285) Had the horsemen been present, it is quite likely that at the very least the Athenian losses would have been magnified.

In order to prevent the enemy’s longer formation from enveloping his smaller force, Militades lengthened his battle line by weakening the center and extending the wings. Thus the middle of the army would be more vulnerable, but the Greeks would not have to worry about attacks from the flanks. The Persians were unfamiliar with the Greek mode of fighting. They were bewildered when these heavily armored men broke into a full charge about a quarter mile out. The two lines collided, and not surprisingly the Persians broke through the Greek center, but their comrades on the wings were turned back by the force of the impact. While the troops from the Persian wings fled to their ships, those from the center were encircled by the Greeks and massacred, 6,400 in all, the defenders losing a mere 192.

The Persians were undoubtedly stunned, but had a strong enough force to make a second attempt. They decided to sail around Attica and approach Athens from the West, but the Athenians anticipated this move, and marched to meet the threat. The Persians, having had a taste of Greek battle tactics, decided not to press the issue further, and returned home. Thus ended the first military encounter between the Greeks and Persians. The Athenians demonstrated the terrible effectiveness of the phalanx and proved that their enemy was not the invincible host it was imagined to be. Crucial to this victory was the armament of the Greek soldier. The typical Persian soldier, according to Herodotus, was lightly armed, better suited for ranged attack than a close-quarters melee. “They use bows and arrows and a short spear; they wear trousers in the field and cover their heads with turbans.” (Herodotus V.49) His Greek counterpart, however, scorned the use of missile weapons. He was accustomed to fighting hand-to-hand, and was well equipped to do so. While the arms of each individual soldier varied according to his desires and means, one can speak in general terms about the typical array covering the hoplite. Nearly every Greek soldier wore some form of helmet, be it the encompassing Corinthian helmet, which covered the head, neck, and face, or the less protective but more comfortable pilos, which protected only the crown. The lower leg was protected by a thin bronze greave, and the torso by heavy bronze plate armor. Adding extra protection was a large shield, the hoplon, made of wood and covered in bronze. This heavy item, some sixteen pounds, was strapped to the left arm and covered a large portion of both the bearer’s body and that of his partner to the left. The shield was perhaps the weakest element of the soldier’s armor: “its three-foot diameter demanded that it be thinly constructed to keep the overall weight within tolerable limits.” (Hanson, 1989 p.70) After the initial collision between armies, many troops along the front ranks found their shield shattered by the impact. Nevertheless, it offered some degree of protection, and undoubtedly made its bearer feel more secure. In all, the Greek soldier far outclassed the Persian in equipment. His armor protected him from Persian missiles, as did his tendency to charge over the final gap between the armies, getting through the killing field as quickly as possible. At the same time, the Persians had little with which to defend themselves from the soldiers of the phalanx. The Greeks specialized in shock warfare; their battles were giant collisions followed by a great pushing match. None could withstand the might of this machine. In every encounter with the Persians it proved superior. Alexander would relegate the infantry to a defensive role, holding the enemy until his cavalry could make the decisive blow, but it was the backbone of his forces, and indispensable to his success.

King Darius died before he could plan another attempt to bring the Greeks to heel. A decade later, his son Xerxes took up the cause, persuaded by a cousin who wished to be granted the Satrapy of Greece. In 481, he assembled a large army and a great fleet with which to overwhelm the Greeks. Herodotus numbers the army at 1,800,000 men and the navy at 1,207, but this seems excessive simply due to the logistical problems associated with marching an army of that magnitude.(Herodotus VII.184-9) The number of ships is increased further when one considers the 674 ships Herodotus wrote were used to construct a bridge over the Hellespont.(Herodotus VII.136) If these numbers are correct, Xerxes would have had 1,881 vessels committed to this campaign alone. This is not likely; most historians number the army between 150,000 and 200,000 men, and the navy at 700 ships, still a very formidable force. In 480, these troops were sent marching around the Hellespont to once again attempt to punish the Greeks.

When it was heard that the Persians were preparing to invade, several cities quickly formed an alliance under the command of the Spartans, while others, especially those that lay directly in the path of the Persian army, allied with the Great King. As the Persians marched into Greece from the north, the defenders marched from the south, hoping to prevent their entrance at the pass of Thermopylae. The events that occurred there have become legendary. The much smaller army held the pass against an incessant onslaught of Persian troops, including the elite Immortals. The Persians were cut to pieces while the Greeks remained quite unharmed. The nature of the pass itself made the superior numbers of the Persians less significant - the giant army was confined to a space fifty feet wide - but the most important factor was again the armament of the Greeks. Their heavier armor and longer spears wreaked havoc on their attackers, and it was only due to the efforts of an informant that Xerxes outflanked the Greeks, destroyed the Spartan contingent, and moved into Greece proper as the allies fell back to the Peloponnese. Athens was evacuated; the Persian army arrived at the city to find it deserted, with the exception of a few holdouts on the acropolis. Once these had been dispatched, they looted the temples and burned them to the ground.

After the defeat of his navy near Salamis the following September, the Great King decided to retire to Asia for the winter. He feared that the victorious fleet, free from opposition, might destroy his bridge across the Hellespont, trapping him in Greece. He left a moderate force behind under the command of Mardonius, who was to meet the Greeks in battle the following year. At this encounter, near Plataea, the Greeks were caught in an unfavorable position and yet managed to rout the Persians. The two armies had come to the area ready for battle, but delayed action for two weeks as the soothsayers of each promised victory if their army stood on the defensive.(Herodotus IX.36-7) As this waiting went on, Alexander I of Macedon, the great-great-grandfather of Alexander III, approached the Greeks in secret, as his nation was then a subject of Persia, and told them that Mardonius had decided to attack despite the predictions. He did this, he professed, out of love of the Greeks, and asked that they remember this act if they were victorious. It is more likely that he was expanding his options in light of a potential Persian defeat, and as it came to pass, his collaboration with Xerxes was better remembered than his aid to the Hellenes.

The Persians forced the encounter by seizing the fountain of Gargaphia, the sole source of water for the Greeks. A council was held in which the Hellenes decided to retire to a nearby river. One of the Spartan officers was not present at the meeting, and when the troops began to move, he refused, thinking it cowardice. The remainder of the Spartans, though they tried to persuade him, refused to leave one of their own. The Athenians remained as well, waiting for the Spartans to resolve their issue. The stubbornness of the man was finally overcome, and shortly before dawn the remainder of the troops began marching away. Their enemy had been watching the proceedings and seized the opportunity to attack while their enemy was divided and weakened. The Spartans were attacked by the Persian contingent, while the Athenians were pitted against the Greek thralls of the Great King. The Persians had every advantage imaginable save one, the hoplite panoply. Once again, this proved decisive and the invaders were put to flight shortly after Mardonius had been killed. The Athenians and Spartans relentlessly pursued the enemy and inflicted a huge number of casualties. The Persian invasions were at an end, and both sides had learned valuable lessons. The Great King realized that facing the Greeks in battle was simply too costly, and in the future he would resort to more subtle methods when dealing with them. The Greeks saw the weaknesses in Persian warfare, and soon would begin an offensive of their own in the form of a naval alliance.

Shortly after, or perhaps during, the battle of Plataea, a battle at Mycale destroyed the remainder of the Persian fleet and caused an uprising of the Ionic cities in Asia Minor. In 478, Athens formed an alliance with these and other nearby states at Delos. The goal of this alliance was to secure the independence of each member state and to reduce the Persian ability to make war on the sea. The League was very successful in keeping Persian sea-power at a minimum for nearly three decades under the command of the Athenian Cimon, but what was established as a cooperative alliance soon became an empire. Athens was not at all opposed to keeping members in line by force, as the brutal repression of the Naxian and Thasian attempts to revolt give testimony to. The Thasians, in a last ditch effort to save themselves, sent an envoy to Sparta asking them to come to their aid against Athens. The Spartans had grown wary of Athens’ increasing power and so agreed, but an earthquake and the subsequent revolt by the Helots prevented them from fulfilling this promise. During this revolt, the desperate Spartans called on the Athenians for aid in storming a rebel city, but dismissed them out of suspicion. With this affront began the hostility between the two states. Cities throughout Greece found themselves aligning with one of two parties, either the Athenians or the Peloponnesians.

Athens was stretching herself thin, fighting enemies overseas and at home. Realizing that their situation was precarious, the Athenians made peace with Persia in 449. The situation in Greece continued to escalate until 431, when full scale war erupted. Sparta, the Peloponnesian counterbalance to Athens, had been reluctant to get involved, but out of fear of the other’s power allowed themselves to be persuaded by her allies. Unlike previous engagements, this would not be over in a matter of days. Fighting would continue off and on over the next three decades, ravaging the people and the countryside, and changing the way the Greeks waged war.

A significant change was the scope of the conflict. Instead of battling over a small strip of borderland, the adversaries were fighting to substantially weaken one another and to establish political dominance in Greece. It could be argued that Sparta and her allies were truly fighting for independence, as they claimed, and that the dominion of Sparta that followed the war was an unintended after effect. Without a doubt they wished to break the might of Athens, which was a much larger goal than had existed in prior wars. The mountainous terrain of Greece divided the political landscape into sequestered zones and fostered isolationism and xenophobia in each. While this fierce nationalism often led to armed conflict, there rarely had been a serious threat to the vitality of the defending city due to the difficulties associated with besieging and storming a walled city as well as the aforementioned agricultural constraints on the soldiers. By the fifth-century, siege technology had vastly improved; during this war not even Athens was exempt from reduction in this manner, and many of the smaller allies of each would suffer likewise, prompting Thucydides to remark: “Never were so many cities captured and depopulated - some by barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another...” (Thucydides I.23) This war profoundly affected Greek strategy. It paved the way for method of war employed by Epaminondas against Athens and, by extension, Alexander against the Persians.

In the beginning of the war, neither side could gain a tremendous advantage over the other. Athens had an unmatched fleet, and Sparta was clearly dominant on land. Neither cared to meet the other at such a disadvantage. A peace treaty formally ended the fighting between Athens and Sparta for nearly seven years, but the hostility remained and “they did each other all the harm which they could.” (Thucydides V.25) During this interval, both Sparta and Athens waged war against various other cities, the most notable being Athens’ campaign against Syracuse. It was the first Greek endeavor to involve an extended overseas commitment, the size of which was outstanding: 150 ships and their compliments, 4,000 Athenian hoplites, 300 cavalry, and various other troops.(Thucydides VI.31) That Athens could manage an endeavor of such magnitude is testament to her incredible power, but in the end it would be a costly mistake. The expedition became trapped on Syracuse and completely destroyed. The loss was horrendous; Athens had invested heavily in the expedition, and suddenly found herself bankrupt, lacking a strong navy and a major portion of her army.

When word of this event spread throughout Greece, many subjects of Athens, taking advantage of her weakened position, revolted. To make matters worse, in 412 Sparta formed an alliance with the Great King. The Persians had devised a new strategy for dealing with the Greeks. Rather than confront them in pitched battles, where the Greeks had proven their mastery, the Persians would secure the cooperation of a major power within Greece proper. In return for Persian assistance, Sparta agreed to respect the King’s dominion over the Greek cities of Asia and to aid him in the event of any uprisings. The Athenians managed to hold out for eight more years, but their losses in Sicily and the decline of prestige that accompanied it proved too much in conjunction with the Persian influence. The Athenians sued for peace after a siege brought their city to the verge of starvation in 404.

The war had been catastrophic for Athens and for much of Greece. Sparta, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly powerful. The liberator became the oppressor. Cities that had once taken up arms against the power of Athens now chaffed under Spartan dominance. So powerful had the Lacedaemonians become that they became involved in a dynastic struggle against the Persian king Artaxerxes II Mnemon. The terms of their alliance with the King had stipulated that in the event of a revolt, the Spartans would assist in bringing the rebels to heel, but when the Ionic cities of Asia broke their bonds from the King to side with his younger brother Cyrus, Sparta made no move. Nor did the Spartans try to prevent nearly 13,000 Greek mercenary troops from aiding the usurper. At Cunaxa the two brothers met in combat, and Xenophon reports that the bulk of the King’s army broke into flight before even clashing with the Greeks, leaving the mercenary force completely intact.(Xenophon I.8) At the same time, Cyrus led his horsemen against his brother and was slain. The King reformed his troops to do battle with the unscathed Greek army, but again their fear got the better of them, and the Persians fled the field. The repute of Greek ferocity in battle alone decided the conflict, but though victorious, the Hellenes found themselves in hostile territory lacking provisions and direction. The King made truce with them, and provided them with stores for their march back home, but the Greeks remained wary. After all, they had brazenly marched into Persian lands with the explicit purpose of killing Artaxerxes. Their fears were soon realized as their commanders were murdered at a meeting arranged by the Satrap Tissaphernes on the pretext of goodwill. The Greeks were stunned and forlorn, but Xenophon rallied them, reminding them that the King had demanded that they lay down their weapons after the death of Cyrus.

But when we, instead of giving up our arms, put them on and went and pitched our camp near him, his manner changed. It is hard to say what he did not do, he was so at his wit’s end, sending us embassies and begging for a truce, and furnishing provisions the while, until he had got it. (Xenophon III.1)

The soldiers held elections and chose new commanders, Xenophon among them. To address their deficiency in cavalry and missile troops, they decided to enlist some 200 Rhodian slingers and to create a small cavalry force out of fifty horses that were being used as pack animals. They were constantly harassed by the Persians, who at one point began burning their own villages to prevent them from gaining sustenance. To this Xenophon replied “Do you not see, men of Hellas, they admit that the country is now ours...setting fire to it as if it were not their own.” (Xenophon III.5) They successfully evaded Tissaphernes, their chief antagonist, and fought their way north to the coast of the Black Sea, where they found friendly Hellenic cities. With their aid, the troops advanced to Chrysopolis at the mouth of the black sea, and there crossed over to Byzantium and Europe. The expedition was at an end, although most of the troops would subsequently be enlisted by the Spartans, who formally broke the truce with Persia when they received news of a fleet amassing at Phoenicia. This amazing accomplishment would fuel the cries for a large-scale invasion of Persia. To the advocates of such a plan, the exploits of Xenophon and the mercenaries indicated the weaknesses of the Persian Empire, and underscored the heights to which an allied Hellas could rise.

Yet tensions between the Greek cities were great. The Peloponnesian war had created an incredible amount of hostility and suspicion. The Persians used this to their advantage, keeping the cities in a state of disunity through alliances and funding. In 395 a Persian ambassador was sent to various cities within Greece, offering gold to those who would wage war against Sparta. Many cities, including Corinth and Argos, accepted. Athens refused the bribe, but “were none the less eager for the war...” (Xenophon H.III.5) The Persians also employed Greek mercenaries in their army and navy, and in 394 enlisted the Athenian admiral Conon to assist in the defeat of the Spartan fleet. The Persians would eventually fund the rebuilding of the fortifications around the port of Piraeus, destroyed by the Spartans at the end of the Peloponnesian war. This caused a stir in Sparta, and they dispatched an emissary to make peace with Persia and form a new alliance. Meanwhile, the Greeks fought on until 387 when, desiring peace, all parties agreed to terms stipulated by the Great King. The Ionic cities of Asia minor were again sold out to the King, while the remaining Greek cities were recognized as independent. Sparta was the favorite of Persia, and retained quite a bit of authority which it used to punish those who had been its enemies. This treaty, known as the King’s Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas, was to be a very sore point with many Greeks in the years to come.

Thebes, a small, rural city in Boeotia, was an unlikely contender for political dominance in Greece. Her citizens did not possess the military repute of Sparta, nor the navy of Athens. Thebes had been the ally of Sparta during the Peloponnesian war, and had shown incredible fighting skill at Delium in 424, when Athenian hoplites, Socrates among them, were sent home in disgrace. Yet the growing dominance of Sparta unsettled the Thebans, who in 395 joined the alliance opposing it. The war did not go well for them, and their suffering continued after the peace of 387. In 382 the Spartans occupied the sacred Theban acropolis, an act which was an enormous offence. This set off a chain of events that would propel the Thebans to heights never before realized. For a brief, shining moment, this city, led by Epaminondas, would dazzle the Greek world and bring down the might of the Spartan state.

In 379, having suffered the Spartan occupation of their holy sites for three years, the Thebans struck back, dramatically retaking the Cadmeia and throwing off Spartan dominance. In 375, the first serious Spartan attempt to punish Thebes was defeated. By the next year, all of Boeotia had become federated. The franchise was extended to the poor throughout this new state, allowing for a greater military potential as only citizens could serve as hoplites. Epaminondas became the principal leader of this movement, serving as one of seven Boeotarchs and as the commander of the Boeotian army. He inherited the powerful Greek infantry tradition and modified it to further increase its effectiveness. He was to be a great influence on Philip II of Macedon, who completely reformed the armies of his country and opened the doorway to his son’s victories.

Traditionally, the Greek line of battle was eight rows deep. Epaminondas took the Theban tendency to form deeper lines and augmented it to concentrate force on a single point, namely the left wing. While the right wing remained a standard depth, the left would extend back as many as fifty rows, giving it a greater attack power.(Hanson, 1999, pp.46) This deep left wing was manned exclusively by Thebans, while their Boeotian allies comprised the rest of the line. The choice of the left wing as opposed to the right was designed exclusively for fighting the Spartans, who kept their elite, the Equals, on the right. In any encounter, the deeper Theban wing would be directly opposed to the Spartan elite, and would be used to deliver the decisive blow. This innovation came to be known as “the oblique order of battle.” (Wilcken, 1997 pp.30) In addition to the heavy infantry, the Boeotian army made extensive use of their cavalry to protect the phalanx from flank attacks and missile troops. In 371, the might of the Boeotian force was demonstrated as the Thebans crashed through the Spartan line at Leuctra, killing the Spartan king and hundreds of Equals. It was a devastating defeat, and had it occurred a century earlier, before the effects of the Peloponnesian war, it may have been left at that, but Epaminondas had greater plans. He had inflicted great casualties on the Spartans, but in time the dead could be replaced and the army reformed. Epaminondas wanted to ensure that his city would forever be free from the threat of Sparta. To this end he planned the destruction of the Spartan way of life.

Spartan men were able to devote themselves to military training, as was stated earlier, due to the fact that their agricultural needs were supplied by the Helots. Their power rested heavily on this fact. Epaminondas realized that to break his opponent, he would have to do more than to defeat them on the field of battle: he must destroy the social institutions that allowed them to field professional armies. In this case, it meant freeing the Helots. In the summer of 370, Epaminondas and Pelopidas led a huge allied army of 70,000 soldiers and followers across the Peloponnese. The army marched into Spartan territory and paraded around the city as the terrified populace looked helplessly from the acropolis, unwilling to face this terrible force in battle. Sparta remained inviolate, for destruction of the city proper was not the goal of this campaign. Instead, these troops destroyed her port at Gytheum and after a brief winter hiatus in Arcadia, marched into Messenia to liberate the Helots.

The Spartan defeat at Leuctra had led to uprisings among many subject states in the Peloponnese and had greatly diminished the repute of the Spartan army. Epaminondas’ march through Spartan lands in 370 humiliated the city, and made the Helots ache for freedom. As he marched through Messenia thousands of Helots rallied to the liberating army. At Mount Ithome, a sacred location for Messenians, a new city was founded for the freed slaves and fortified with Theban assistance - ensuring security from their former masters. Thus the Spartan state was enervated and would no longer be the dominant force in Greek politics. Thebes was not destined to take her place, although not for lack of trying. Xenophon relates that Pelopidas had traveled to Persia around 367 in an attempt to forge an alliance.(Xenophon H.VII.1.33) In the years since the Peloponnesian war, Persia’s goodwill was a prerequisite for political dominance in Greece, and with the fall of Sparta, Persia would need a new confederate. Thebes’ connection with Persia was short-lived, for in 362, Epaminondas was killed in a battle at Mantinea, and the glory days of the Boeotian Federation were at an end. No Greek state would fill the void left by Sparta. The new power would come from the north, out of the backward and unlikely kingdom of Macedon.

Philip of Macedonia was the youngest son of King Amyntas. When his father died, his mother’s ambitious lover, Ptolemy, killed the eldest brother and ruled as regent for the child Perdiccas. During this time Ptolemy negotiated a treaty with Thebes, and sent several high-ranking hostages to secure the alliance. Among these was the young Philip, who lived with the general Pammens, a friend of Epaminondas. During his three year stay in Thebes, Philip became acquainted with the tactics of Epaminondas. Upon his return to Macedonia, he began a massive reform of the army, creating the mighty force that would later propel him to mastery over Greece and would, under his son, conquer Asia. Among the reformations of Philip was the modification of the Macedonian infantry, the Pezhetairoi. He armed them with an extremely long and heavy spear, the sarissa, which was perhaps twice as long as the traditional spear of the Greeks. One advantage that the Greeks had always enjoyed over the Persians was the length of their spears. That advantage now was being extended, quite literally. These spears required the use of both hands, and to facilitate this the pelta, a small round shield that was strapped to the forearm instead of gripped, was adopted. They retained the heavier armament typical of Greek infantrymen, and were thus well suited for defense.

The Hetairoi, or Companions, were noble Macedonian horsemen. They did not undergo as drastic a reform as the infantry. Philip’s major change was organizational. In order to increase the efficiency of the unit, he divided it into regiments. This was to be the offensive element of the Macedonian army. Whereas Epaminondas relied on a heavier concentration of infantry to break through enemy lines, Philip and Alexander would use the swift moving cavalry to attack from the flanks while the phalanx engaged in the center. Both the Pezhetairoi and the Hetairoi were subject to Philip’s intensive exercises, including close-order drill and long marches wearing full gear. Before long the Macedonian army had become the greatest force in the region. Philip deserves an incredible amount of credit for his son’s exploits, for he bequeathed to him the resources to accomplish them, but his developments were not revolutionary. The army he developed was founded on the traditional Greek phalanx, which time and again proved its mastery over Persian forces.

Philip’s reign was characterized by violence from the very moment he ascended to the throne. He succeeded his brother Perdiccas in 359 after the latter was killed along with four thousand troops in battle with the Illyrians. The new king inherited an impoverished army, a hostile neighbor that was planning to invade, and several usurpers vying for his title. He bought himself time through a policy of murder and bribery while he rebuilt his military. In the spring of 358 he led his newly formed army against the Illyrians near Monastir. The forces of the two nations were equal in size, but the reformations of Philip weighed heavily in Macedonia’s favor. Advancing in an oblique line, he caused the Illyrian line to stretch to conform to his own. Thus weakened, it was easy prey for the cavalry that burst through the right wing, creating a path for Philip’s infantry and causing havoc among the Illyrians. The battle destroyed Illyria’s military and helped to secure Macedonia from external threats.

In 356, Philip acquired the immensely rich gold and silver mines around Mount Pangaeus after he aided the city of Crenides against the Thracians. The wealth he gained by this was enormous, netting the king one-thousand talents per year. This would play a great role in his acquisition of power, for his army was very expensive to maintain. By the time of his death, however, this boon would only cover the costs of one-third of his army.(Green, 1991, pp.153) Also in this year came the birth of Alexander by Philip’s wife Olympias. The king placed his son first under the tutelage of Leonidas, a hardened man who placed great emphasis on physical excellence, and later Aristotle, the pupil of Plato.

A decade after the birth of Alexander, Philip greatly increased his holdings and popularity by ousting the Phocians from Delphi at the request of the Amphictyonic Council, which administered the shrine. His fame skyrocketed, prompting Isocrates view him as the only plausible candidate to head a crusade against Persia. In his Address to Philip, he reiterated many of the points from his earlier oration, the Panegyricus, made much of Philip’s divine pedigree (from Heracles), and introduced Philip to the idea of Panhellenism. This would allow the king to exploit the idea of an attack on Persia for his goal of mastery in Greece. For the time being, Philip was in no position to undertake such a mission. While in no imminent danger, his control at home was still rather weak. This is exemplified by the rebellion of the Maedi in 340.

Philip had left Macedonia on a campaign against the Byzantines and the rebels, believing the young regent Alexander to be weak, arose against Macedonian rule. Alexander acted quickly, defeating the Maedi and taking their city, which he renamed Alexandropolis (not modern Greek Alexandroupolis but a place somewhere in modern southeast Bulgaria). Meanwhile, war with Athens had broken out as a result of Philip’s seizure of 230 Athenian vessels, and he was forced to lift the siege of Byzantium. The Athenians had also provoked Artaxerxes III Ochus into declaring war on Macedonia. The situation was desperate: Philip’s army, no matter how well trained, would have a difficult time fighting off a unified effort between the Greeks and Persians. He acted quickly by sending his army south preceded by ambassadors who attempted to dissuade an alliance between Thebes and Athens, but when the two realized that Philip’s army was approaching, they quickly joined forces. Athens sent her army north to rendezvous with that of Thebes; together they meant to prevent the Macedonian army from further advance. For a time they were successful.

Philip rested during the winter of 339/338. While the alliance of Thebes and Athens made his position more difficult, he nevertheless possessed an advantage. The Athenian army was largely mercenary and entirely armed in the traditional style. Philip’s soldiers were better trained and more disciplined than any the Athenians could muster, to say nothing of their superior equipment. The sarissae of the Macedonian soldiers could hold a traditional Greek phalanx at quite a distance while allowing no harm to come to their bearers. The King was quite confident in his troops and tactics, and sought to meet the enemy in a pitched battle. This he did at Chaeronea in the spring of 338.

The allied army had retreated from the passes after Philip destroyed a mercenary force guarding one of the routes. At Chaerona they positioned themselves between the Acropolis on their left and the River Cephissus on their right, hoping to pivot with the left flank and push the Macedonians against the river. Philip drew up his troops, placing his cavalry on the left flank under the command of Alexander. The horsemen were up against the Thebans, including the Sacred Band, who were expected to put up a strong fight. This elite unit had training comparable to that of the Macedonian army, and the Thebans had broken an alliance with Philip, and thus had more to loose. Philip led from the center, and advanced while his left flank held back. When the center made contact with the Athenians, Philip ordered a reversal, drawing his enemy out of their position. As the Athenians exultantly rushed forward, the better disciplined Thebans held their positions and a gap opened in the Greek lines. Alexander and the Companions charged and surrounded the Thebans while Philip, seeing the Athenian infantry in disarray from their disorganized pursuit of his forces, reversed directions once again, and routed the Greeks.

The citizens of Athens were distraught and began arming every able man for defense. Philip, however, had no desire to attack the city and further alienate the people of Greece. He offered generous terms, which the Athenians gladly accepted. Thebes was treated a good deal harsher: the Boeotian Federation was destroyed and the member cities given independence. Philip began making peace throughout Greece, culminating in the conference at Corinth in early October. Every city joined the new League, except Sparta. The cities of Greece bound themselves together and allied with Philip for the purpose of a Persian expedition. The official motive of this move was revenge for the destruction of Greek temples during the Persian invasions of the fifth-century. In actuality, Philip’s designs were expansionist in nature, and the Greeks had no choice but to comply, although it is likely that many supported the idea. It could tie up the Macedonian in Asia for quite some time, affording the Greek cities some breathing room. It would also put an end to Persia’s influence in their domestic affairs and finally liberate the Ionic cities of Asia.

Philip’s plans were grand, but he did not live to see them to fruition. In July of 336, he was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. Alexander immediately began securing his power by invading Thrace and Illyria. Both campaigns demonstrate the ingenuity of the king in military matters. In Thrace, Alexander came across a group of rebels in the Balkans. The defenders had formed a barricade out of wagons at the mouth of a pass, but intended to roll them down on the Macedonians as they filed through narrows, destroying the cohesion of the army and paving the way for an infantry charge. Alexander recognized this, and informed his men, advising them to either make way for the wagons or to drop to the ground and use their shields for cover. Due to this foresight, the Macedonian army took the pass and killed 1,500 of the enemy with few or no losses.(Arrian I.I)

While he was engaged in the Thracian campaign, the king of Illyria revolted. Alexander quickly led his army back through the Balkans to the city of Pelium, were the king had situated himself. As Alexander prepared to besiege the fortress, an ally of the Thracians, the Taulantians, arrived on the scene and surrounded the Macedonian army. Alexander was caught in a killing-field: a small plain beset on three sides by mountains with no escape route. Alexander’s solution was, in the words of Peter Green, (one of the most eccentrically brilliant stratagems in the whole history of warfare.((1991, pp.132) Just after dawn, Alexander drew his army into a deep formation and began practicing close-order drill in complete silence. To either side of his phalanx, cavalry formations of two-hundred men apiece drilled likewise in complete silence, responding to hand signals. The soldiers swung their sarissae in unison as they marched in silence around the plain. The Taulantians were astonished and quitted their positions to view the spectacle. When he judged that they were sufficiently engrossed, Alexander ordered his troops to form a wedge and charge. At the same time, the Macedonians beat their spears upon their shields and gave a great war-cry; the combined effect of the charge and clamor served to terrify the Taulantians, and most ran for the safety of Pelium. After occupying the heights, Alexander decided to withdraw his army from this precarious situation. From this vantage point, he could see the enemy army regrouping, and realized that they intended to attack his rear during the crossing of a nearby river. He delayed such an attack by charging with his companions, and then ordered his archers to station themselves in the middle of the river to protect the infantry crossing. He also drew his siege engines up along the shore to add to the covering fire in the first recorded use of field artillery ever and, combined with the archers, preserved the life of every Macedonian soldier.

These campaigns attest to the competency of Alexander in military affairs, as would his exploits throughout the rest of his life. In Asia, he commenced his campaign by a systematic reduction and capture of every Persian seaport on the East Mediterranean coast, destroying his naval power. This would have the effect, intended or otherwise, of preventing Darius from hiring Greek mercenaries to offset the deficiencies in his own infantry. After the destruction of his Greek contingent at the battle of Issus, the second of Alexander’s campaign, the Great King lacked heavy infantry to pit against the Macedonian phalanx. Later, at Gaugamela, the Macedonian’s performance is nothing short of brilliant where he devised tactics to defeat the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. Using his cavalry to hide infantry troops along the wings, he tempted the Persians to divert troops to an attack on his flanks. As his cavalry and infantry held the Persian cavalry at bay, Alexander led his Companions through their weakened center and put the army to flight. Although the heavy cavalry of Darius outnumbered Alexander’s nearly five-to-one, the cunning of the Macedonian secured a complete victory. It would be interesting to know if Philip could have done better. Nevertheless, without the advancements of his father, which relied heavily on those of Epaminondas, Alexander would likely have been another impotent king of Macedonia. Moreover, his conquest depended upon the military customs of Greece that exalted direct hand-to-hand combat, leading to the hoplite tradition that was so crucial to his success with the enfranchisement of the yeomanry during the Greek Dark Ages.

The geography of Greece was instrumental in Alexander’s success. Not only did it play a role in the development of the phalanx (for cavalry is not well suited to mountainous terrain), it served to divide the population into districts and prevented the unification of a Greek state. This precluded a spontaneous Panhellenic movement to oust the Great King and offered an opportunity for exploitation by the Persians. This political fragmentation also paved the way for Philip’s conquest, for it was only Thebes and Athens that opposed his entry, not the coalition that had stopped the Persians.

Alexander was a man of great ambition, skill, and vision, this much is beyond doubt. Yet his campaign was not, as I hope I have shown, unforeseen or inexplicable. The cities of Greece were pitched headlong towards a great confrontation with Persia after the donation of Athens during the Ionian revolt. The capability of a Hellenic army to defeat a Persian, as was repeatedly demonstrated, did not come from the innovations of Philip or Epaminondas, but existed from the outset of the conflict: the Persians never succeeded in breaking a Greek battle line, and only defeated one Greek force, the Spartans at Thermopylae, by overwhelming them from all sides. Alexander’s victory is, from this perspective, nonetheless spectacular, but at the same time seems fitting. Thus, perhaps one can say that the nature of Alexander’s genius, and by extension that of his father, is that it allowed him to see in the words of Hegel (what was ripe for development,( and that the gifts which fortune had brought him allowed him to actualize it.