Introduction
The piracy threat which came to a head in the decade of the 60’s BC was in part due to Rome’s complacency about the issue. Rather than stamping out small pockets of pirates early on, they allowed piracy to flourish into a large force of marauders. A poor economy and oppressive social conditions also fed the pirate forces as men who were on the verge of bankruptcy discovered more profit as robbers and pillagers. Rome was unwilling to act conclusively toward the reduction of pirate forces because those forces, along with tax companies, provided slaves for the large luxury markets. The pirates did not attack Rome as an enemy, but treated all targets equally, as opportunities for profit.

Cilicia Tracheia
Although the pirates ranged over much of the navigable Mediterranean, they concentrated their raids on major shipping lanes. Upon these lanes goods were transported between the far western provinces of Spain and Africa, Rome and the rest of Italy, and the eastern provinces including Macedonia, Greece, Syria and Egypt. Naturally desiring a base or home port, many pirates set up on the coast of present day Turkey, in an area known as Cicilia Tracheia. This area afforded great protection for the pirates. The coastline was complicated and full of twists and turns and hidden ports. The land was locked off from the rest of Asia Minor by the large mountains of the Taurus range. Many of the passes were steep and difficult to cross. The slopes of these mountains were overrun with forests of oak and pine, providing plenty of wood for the construction of ships.*1 As Roman influence rose in the general area of Asia Minor, the influence of the native powers, such as Seleucid Syria and Rhodes, declined (Diod. Sic., XVIII, 22; Rom. Civ., sec. 78). These were the people who patrolled coastal waters and controlled pirate populations. As their power was replaced by that of the Romans, their patrols were not, and the pirates grew unchecked. The inhabitants of Cilicia tended to be fairly unruly anyway, which may have accelerated the decline of patrols as “police” forces tired of constantly dealing with them without assistance from Rome (Diod. Sic., XVIII, 22).

The pirates, quite wisely, set an information network whereby they would learn of the cargo and destination of ships while in harbor and attack them at sea, plundering away. These tactics proved quite successful. As their influence grew, the pirates became bolder, attacking coastal cities and capturing inhabitants. The pirates, through their raids, were large contributors to the slave trade in places like Delos and Side, making Rome reluctant to crack down on their tyranny (Diod. Sic., XXXVI, 3). Cities began to form alliances with the pirates to avoid being plundered and terrorized since they received little protection from Rome. Many port cities provided their services and facilities to the pirates, while others paid tribute as if they were conquered. In effect, these cities “purchased [their] exemption from [pirate] raids.”*2

The Pirate Law
A fragmentary inscription found at Delphi is a 100BC document that set “in stone” rules for dealing with pirates. In short, no one was to deal with pirates. The law states that Roman citizens should be able to “conduct, without peril, whatever business they desire,” presumably wherever they desire. A copy of the law was to be sent by messengers of Rhodes to the kings of Cyprus, Alexandria, Egypt, Cyrene, and Syria informing them that no pirate is to “use the kingdom, land, or territory of any Roman ally as a base of operation. No official or garrison will harbor pirates and should be considered zealous collaborators for the safety of all.” Naturally, the Roman senate included an elastic clause granting them the “power to decree as it deems best in keeping with the interests of the state and own good faith.” To ensure that the law was circulated to those under its jurisdiction “a bronze tablet, marble stele, or whitewashed bulletin board will be placed in any city,” presumably on the coasts, “in the sanctuary or market for all to see.” “The praetor, consul or proconsul shall vow within ten days of hearing of this law to do everything charged with in [it] and shall not do anything contrary to its provisions with malice aforethought. Other magistrates shall within five days take an oath by Jupiter and ancestral gods to uphold the law and see to it that others,” meaning the general public, “follow the law.”*3

Another fragmentary inscription found at Cnidos seems to be either an extension or a lost portion of the Delphi text. The Cnidos text is quite broken in the beginning, but does exhibit certain similarities. This text confirms that the kings of Syria, Alexandria, Egypt, Cyrene and Cyprus were to prevent the harboring of pirates within their spheres of influence and that the messengers of this law were to be Rhodians. In addition, this text specifies a fine of 200,000 sestertii for non compliance with the law. The Cnidos text also declares the region of Cilicia as a praetorian province. Interestingly, Lykaonia was exempted from this law by the Cnidos text.*4

By its existence, the pirate law in general, suggests that the territories in question, Syria, Egypt, Cyprus and others were dealing with the pirates in a manner detrimental to Roman citizens or concerns. These territories were all near the Cilician coast and were probably intimidated into cooperating with the pirates. The exemption of Lykaonia, which was within Asia Minor, indicates that area may have refused dealings with the pirates and instead promoted Roman commerce. Perhaps its exemption was a reward for good behavior in the eyes of Rome. The pirate law may also be an attempt for Rome to set up a legal basis for the prosecution of pirates, many of whom were disenfranchised citizens or provincials. Rome had waited far too long to solve the pirate problem and was feeling the damage and perhaps the guilt associated with pirate attacks.

Commands Against the Pirates Before Pompey
In 102BC, Marcus Antonius was given a command to reduce the pirates. It seems to be more an effort to reduce capture of Romans and provincials by pirates primarily by making a deal with a certain pirate known as Nicomedes (Diod. Sic., XXXVI, 3). Between the years of 77BC and 75BC, Servilius was sent to assist the allies of Lycia in another attempt by Rome to curtail piratical escapades. Ormerod does not believe that Servilius did much to damage the hard core pirates in the area of Cilicia Tracheia because little evidence has been found to support him even entering the waters off that coast (Ormerod, p214-215,220). In 74BC preparations were made for an all-out assault on the Cilician coast under the command of M. Antonius. These were abandoned with the coming of the third Mithradatic War (Plutarch, Lucullus, 6).

The Mithradatic Wars
The pirate life was further advanced by the wars created by Mithradates. While Mithradates wrecked havoc on land, his navy and the pirates under his influence roamed the sea, plundering and pillaging. During his first war against Rome, Mithradates assisted the pirates by providing materials and expertise to begin coastal raiding (Appian, Mith 92). After the conclusion of the conflict, Mithradates’ influence with the pirates declined, but the pirate menace continued. However, Mithradates surfaced twice more, and each time was closely allied with pirate forces. By the third war, the pirates were organized more like regular fleets, and less like bands of robbers. During that time, the pirates captured Iassus, Samos, Clazomenae, and Samothrace. They even plundered the temple at Samothrace and lifted the equivalent of 1000 talents of booty (Appian, Mith, 63).

The close relationship between Mithradates and the pirates was illustrated by an incident during the third war. Mithradates himself obtained passage on pirate ship when his own fleet of sixty was destroyed in a storm. It is said that this storm was responsible for the deaths of 10,000 of Mithradates’ troops. The pirates dropped him off at Sinope, where he continued on to his original destination of Pontus (Appian, Mith, 78).

The pirates are also accused of participating in the sackings of the island of Delos at the behest of Mithradates (Appian, Mith, 28). There is evidence given in Appian’s account of the War with Mithradates that suggests that pirates were also responsible for burning Flaccus’ fleet at Brundisium (Appian, Mith, 51).

The Problem
Appian suggests further that the oppressive conditions set up by Rome’s constant warfare prompted many to renounce their hopeless lives and join the pirate forces (Appian, Mith, 93). Thus pirates gained detailed knowledge of many ports and coastlines, providing a wider range of profitable raids. The pirates had become quite brash by this point, owning garrisons and supply depots manned by “fine crews and expert pilots” (Plutarch, Pompey, 24).

During the turbulent 70’s, the Romans were engaged in various civil wars. While the Romans were thus employed, pirates grew bolder still, leaving the water they knew so well and venturing onto land, raiding islands and coastal cites. They marched up Roman roads and captured those they encountered. These included the two praetors Sextilius and Bellinus with their lictors and servants on the Appian Way (Plutarch, Pompey, 24). A ransom was demanded (and delivered) for the return of the daughter of Antonius. This was the very same Antonius who led the first campaign against the pirates (Cicero, de. imp. Cn. Pomp., 32).

Caesar too, was captured by the pirates near the island of Pharmacusa shortly after escaping from Sulla’s soldiers in 75BC. For some reason, the pirates took a liking to Caesar and instead of executing him for his insolence, they tolerated his posturing. When the pirates set a ransom of 20 talents, Caesar scoffed them and set it at 50, claiming he was worth more. During the month and a half he was detained, Caesar joined the pirates in their revels. He wrote poetry and presented it to the pirates. If they didn’t respond properly, he would chastise them. When he wanted to sleep, he ordered them to be quiet. Indeed, he hardly seemed a prisoner. He even joked that he would come back and kill them all. After his release, Caesar took ships from the harbor of Moletus, and captured those pirates as they lay on the beach. Caesar didn’t agree with Junius, governor of Asia, as to the fate of those pirates and therefore went off and did as he wished. He crucified the lot, although Ormerod says Caesar first slit their throats in an apparent act of mercy (Plutarch, Caesar, 2; Ormerod, p232).

Men of “wealth and good family,” in the words of Plutarch, joined the pirate forces as “soldiers of fortune” gained a reputation of glory and wealth (Plutarch, Pompey, 24). Ships with gilded sails, purple drapings and silvered oars became the mark of the pirate ship as their standard of living rose. Pirates also developed a sense of humor in their treatment of Roman prisoners. The pirates would pretend to cower before their prisoners, and after dressing them in togas and treating them well, the prisoners were allowed to leave, making their way home “by water.” Similar to walking the plank, the Romans had to disembark by rope-ladder and make their own way home over the sea. Those that refused were summarily tossed overboard (Plutarch, Pompey, 24). Prisoners held on land were sometimes brought to where their loved ones could “see sons in chains ... with shackles around their necks.” The pirate behavior was compared to the extortion of Varro and other greedy governors by Cicero (Cicero, Verr., II, 5, 42).

Plutarch’s Life of Crassus chronicles an event whereby the pirates managed to help the Romans and profit at the same time. The rabble-rouser Spartacus booked passage for himself and 2,000 of his troops with pirates to the island of Sicily, where he planned to lead a slave revolt. After being paid, or “receiving gifts” as Plutarch puts it, the pirates skipped town and no doubt celebrated their deception. As Spartacus waited for his ride, Crassus maneuvered into position and constructed fortifications. While these events did not immediately lead to the defeat of Spartacus, they advanced the Roman cause against him (Plutarch, Crassus, 11).

The pirates also seemed to have no difficulty in operating against the best interests of Rome. Sertorius was protected and assisted near the Balearic islands by the pirates in his struggle to avoid capture by Annius and Salinator (Plutarch, Sertorius, 7)

The Solution
The supremacy of Rome was threatened by “drunken revels and flute playing” of the pirates (Plutarch, Pompey, 24). The pirates were so prevalent that trade throughout the Mediterranean was virtually halted. Few ships ventured forth except during the winter (Plutarch, Pompey, 25). With 1,000 ships in service, the pirates captured or raided 400 cities, including Ostia, and plundered the sanctuaries at Claros, Sidura, Samothrace, and the temples of Chthonian Earth (at Hermione), Asclepius (at Epidaurus), Posieden (at Isthmus, Taenarum, and Calauria), Apollo (at Actium and Leucas), Hera (at Samos, Argos and Lacinium) and celebrated the rites of Mithras at Olympus, all this in the year 69BC, during the command of Lucullus (Plutarch, Pompey, 24). Such a precocious threat prompted the well to do in Rome to demand an extraordinary command.

Pompey was prepared and had Gabinius, tribune of the plebeians in 67BC, prepare legislation to give Pompey the command. The lex Gabina (67BC) named Pompey proconsul for three years over the entire Mediterranean. His authority extended over governors fifty miles within any coast. All allies were compelled to submit to his authority. He was given twenty-four propraeters and the authority to raise 120,000 troops, 4,000 cavalry, commission 270 ships, and had 6,000 talents at his disposal. Pompey devised an excellent plan to squash the pirate threat. He set up thirteen districts designed to isolate the various segments of the pirate population. The praetor, or commander, of each district was responsible for the reduction of pirates in his own district (Appian, Mithr, 95).

The African coast, from Carthage to the Strait of Gibraltar was the region of Lentulus Marcellinus. Tiberius Nero was given command of Spanish waters from the Strait of Gibraltar to Mauritania, while Manlius Torquatus got the Balearic Islands. Marcus Pomponius was in charge of the coastal waters of Liguria and Gaul, with Publius Atilius below him, patrolling Corsica and Sardinia. Lucius Gellius Poplicola was responsible for the western coast of Italy, with Plotius Varus protecting Sicily (Appian, Mith., 95). In this fashion, the entire western seas were guarded from the pirates.

The waters east of the Italian peninsula were protected in a similar way. Gnaeus Lentulus Clodianus patrolled the eastern coast of Italy (Appian Mith., 95). Ormerod suggests that Clodianus also patrolled the western coast of Illyria, which makes sense, since that would be all of the Adriatic down to the heel of the Italian coast (Ormerod, p237). Terentius Varro was given the seas between Sicily and Apollonia, including the coast of Epiros down to Acarnania. Lentulus Marcellinus was below Varro to complete the barrier between the western and eastern Mediterranean. The Peloponnesian coast, from Thessaly down to Euboea, were the realm of Lucius Cornelius Sisenna (eastern coast of Greece). The Aegean, from the Hellespont to the Greek islands, belonged to Lucius Lollius. Publius Piso covered Bithynia and Thrace over to the mouth of the Euxine river. Metellus Nepos commanded the area of Asia Minor from Lycia down to Phoenicia and the island of Cyprus (Appian, Mith., 95).

The Cilician coast was the focal point of Pompey himself. He toured all the thirteen regions with the intent of driving the pirates to their strongholds and breaking them there. In forty days, according to Appian, Pompey swept through the western blocks and headed to the eastern waters (Appian, Mith., 95). His name and reputation traveled faster though, and the pirates became terrified. They quickly ceased their pillaging and fled to their garrisons. The thirteen praetors easily able to subdue their regions (Appian, Mith, 95). Pompey chased the die-hards to their large strongholds of Cragus and Anticragus. Appian reports that most pirates surrendered quickly, lending credence to the slogan “the sea was cleared without a fight” (Appian, Mith., 96). Pompey completely eliminated the pirate threat in a mere three months time (Plutarch, Pompey, 28). Pompey captured arms, ships (some under construction), brass, timber (Pompey burned it), rope, sailcloth, and captives. The captives were returned to their homes while their captors were relatively well treated. Pompey seemed to understand some of the causes that led to piracy, and those who joined because of poverty or the results of war were treated well and resettled in the areas of Malla, Adana, Epiphaneia, and Dyme. This merciful act made Pompey the patron of a large area of Asia Minor (Appian, Mith, 96).

Conclusion
Clearly the pirates were not a threat to the naval forces of Rome. When challenged by Pompey, the pirate fleet quickly disintegrated through battles and surrenders. Rome was irresponsible for not providing patrols along the coast of Cilicia Tracheia after it had subjugated the Syrians and Rhodians. At the very least, Rome should have funded the patrols by those peoples. By canceling those activities, Rome threw open a door for a smoldering fire, allowing it to ignite in a spectacular backdraft. It has been said that the people inhabiting Cilicia were unruly and tended toward anarchy, but that is not an excuse for the proliferation of the pirate forces. The oppressive economy and corruption in the provincial governments lead to a growth in the pirate population as people noticed pirates enjoying themselves and profiting enormously. The Roman Aristocracy’s unspoken policy of allowing piracy to help supply the slave trade was ultimately self defeating as pirates attacked land targets in Italy and sacked the island of Delos, center of the slave trade. Not only that, but trade between different areas in the Roman world essentially halted when the pirates became so common that cargo ships refused to depart. The economic uncertainty created could have been averted at less cost than the toleration and final reduction of the pirates. Rome had been injured by relying on a short term policy, when it should have planned for future security.

1 This is a much condensed version of Ormerod’s seemingly endless description of the geography of the region surrounding Cilicia Tracheia (Ormerod, p190-199).

2 Ormerod (p208) states the situation found in Cicero (Verr., II, 4, 22) quite elegantly, clearly communicating the gravity of the threat of pirate raids.

3 SEG, Vol III, No. 378 (FIRA, Vol. I, No. 9), as quoted in sec. 131 of Rom. Civ.

4 JRS, Vol. 64, 1974, p195-220.