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Europe in the eighteenth century was the ground which hosted a certain paradox; expanding armies and yet limited warfare. Indeed, Western Europe greatly increased its military potential during that period. Armies were expanding continuously under monarchs who were convinced - and a sometimes pressed to realize - that the surest means to political success was the possession of large forces. Therefore, armies held the roles of political instruments of dynastic monarchies, and of arbiters of international disputes. Naturally they reflected their respective states even the smallest of which strove to expand their forces. That drive towards military expansion has characterized the eighteenth century as the great age of standing armies. It was also the age of moderation.
Wherever war was concerned, the old order of Europe saw that it was kept limited. despite the ever-increasing massive armies and the multitude of unsettled disputes in the old Continent, wars were fought with limited means for limited objectives. Small successive advantages were sought instead of annihilation of the opponent. Destructive battles were avoided as much as possible and the same applied to movement. Wars of position were favored, where siege craft prevailed. Yet, even in. such a slow kind of warfare, more emphasis was placed on maneuver rather than combat ferocity. In general wars were long but not intense, were fought by professional armies and were clashes between rulers. In this study we will be dealing with the nature of those wars - as well as with that of the conflicts which occurred after the revolution of 1789 - and namely the weapons and tactics involved in them. The points of reference in a study concerning warfare in Europe during the eighteenth century can be no other than Old Regime and Republican France, Frederician Prussia and Great Britain. The armies of the first two and the navy of the third had set at the time the standard for the execution of military operations and led the way towards modern land and naval warfare.
Under Louis XIV France had been the strongest military power in Europe. That position. was held even during the first half of the eighteenth century where a decline occurred in the French army, while the Prussian army under Frederick William and Frederick the Great developed. At that time and up to 1789, both countries executed land warfare in an almost similar way despite the fact that Prussia favored a more aggressive kind of war, while France still adhered to the limited kind. In general though, the issue was shocking massed assaults. As we will see, tactical similarity and technological standardization were common phenomena at that century (Ropp, 35).
Most European wars were fought on the land and opposing armies were arrayed according to pattern. Frederick the Great used to arrange his army in the following way: on each wing cavalry was positioned, while the rear was reserved for the artillery; infantry battalions formed two parallel solid lines with a few hundred yards between them; each line was composed of three ranks with soldiers standing elbow to elbow, each of which rank fired delivering a volley of musket fire at a single command while the other two reloaded (Prussians placed emphasis on non-aimed volume fire). Troops marched in columns which could be transformed to firing lines with cavalry on the flanks. One of the most important tactical innovations of the time was Frederick's concept of the "oblique order". That was a form of flank attack composed by the advance of one wing by echelons with refusal to the other (Paret, 101). In that way a quick victory could be assured by rolling up the enemy's line (by rapid fire and line after line onslaughts on decisive points), the massacre of a frontal clash of two long and solid battle arrays would be avoided, and even in the case of defeat losses would be minimized since the refused wing covered the withdrawal of the wing engaged. Previously, elongated formations were vulnerable and not easily manipulated. In case of victory, lines should remain in position and no destructive pursuit was to be followed, something which minimized though the victor's gains and didn't allow him to exploit his advantage. Frederick, as was common throughout Europe, detested full-scale battles and annihilation of the enemy. He approved of surprise, passivity coupled with offensive action, fixed fortifications and sieges, fighting close to his boarders and of accumulation of small gains. Forcing the enemy to move was his purpose of battle. Steadiness under fire, tactical mobility, responsiveness to command and skill in shifting from marching to battle order were relentlessly sought (Paret, 99). The inhuman drilling (within all armies emphasis was given to physical skills; constant drilling led to perfection) and disciplinary system of the Prussians as well as those of others, definitely saw that tactical alertness was achieved as well as that an automated fighting force where "no one reasoned and everyone executed" (Paret, 99) was created and that desertions which plagued the mercenary and professional armies of the eighteenth century were prevented. Prussia enjoyed a superbly trained and equipped fighting machine the spearhead of which was the notorious throughout Europe Potsdam Regiment (1,200 six-feet tall men, organized in two battalions; also known as the Blue Prussians or the Giants of Potsdam) (O'Connell, 170) Along with Frederick's "oblique order", the other major tactical innovation of the century was the introduction of the Division formation by the French in 1760 (Paret, 106) which brought an end to single mass formations. A division with its own infantry, cavalry and artillery (12,000 men) could engage an enemy successfully while enjoying considerable maneuverability (emphasis on strategic mobility). Armies were now articulated bodies.
The infantry has been characterized as the Queen of Battles (Ropp, 32). The French continuously increased its numbers while the Prussians improved its weaponry. Indeed it had always remained the key factor since not even artillery nor cavalry could harm stretched-out lines of men and well deployed defensive squares respectively. As far as the French are concerned, the primary infantry tactical unit was the battalion (584 officers and men, 8 companies of musketeers, a company of grenadiers). Two battalions formed a regiment. Directly connected to the tactics of those formations was their choice of weapons.
In general the period from 1700 to 1800 saw no major innovations in firearms and weapons in general. Some new ideas though helped to improve arms that were already in use. There was also a number of outstanding military inventions such as explosive-filled artillery shells, rockets, the 5.5-inch mortar-fired explosive projectile, the Shrapnel explosive sub-projectile shell, and a few more all of which were considered to be very cruel weapons and were disregarded. Eighteenth century armies used what they were issued with some refinement and cared for no major improvement.
However, even the slightest improvements that were adapted managed to alter the execution of land warfare considerably. The use of the socket bayonet for instance nearly redefined the role of the infantry. Used both defensively (to defend. musketeers while reloading) and offensively (the courageous bayonet charges; hand-to-hand combat was an intrinsic part of 18th century land warfare) the bayonet managed to homogenize infantry and allowed it to be used in various combinations. The infantryman now possessed a single shock and fire weapon and participated in formations of "skirmishers" (tirailleurs - form of light infantry). In addition to that, the replacement of the matchlock by the flintlock musket firing mechanism as well as the introduction by the Prussians of the double-ended iron ramrod and the funnel-shaped charge hole increased the muzzle-loading muskets' rate of fire. It took twenty-six complicated motions in order to load a musket (previously it took forty four motions; older models needed ninety eight) let alone to prepare the ammunition (ounce balls three quarters of an inch in diameter), fire the weapon and very often deal with malfunctions (with the flintlock misfires were reduced from 50% to 33%) (O'Connell, 157). Yet, the musket was widely used (the "Brown Bess" served for 140 years in every battlefield; 7,800,000 of that 76-caliber smoothbore were produced; with a range of 60 yards it was also capable of five shots per minute) and whole new tactics were created to accommodate it (O'Connell, 158). As we have already mentioned for the Prussian army, musketeers were crowded (ranks reduced from 5 to 3) in order to maximize the tremendous effects of short-range (40 yards; each side tried to wait until the last minute before firing the first volley}, non-aimed (the "fog" of battle and the smoke of the battlefield rendered marksmanship obsolete; only banners, flags and uniforms could sometimes prevent accidental firing on own armies), volley firing (speed and volume emphasized). Physical discipline was of the utmost importance for those musketeer formations since the weakness they already suffered on the flanks (although cavalry covered those) and the joints, was made worse when on combat maneuvers at night or in broken country. Furthermore, rigid lines were kept at all costs since an infantryman's slightest deviation from the marching pattern (to move just a bit forward than the rest) could cost him his hearing (by the muskets fired on his flanks). The Prussian "goose" step (which lives to this day in East European militaries) enabled the whole line to move forward simultaneously in strict order.
We have seen that even the slight improvement of small arms had changed the way in which armies fought. It had also introduced new tactics in deploying various segments of the infantry. In that way French military doctrine back in 1764, called for the two wing half-sections of an infantry battalion to deploy in front as skirmishers (to weaken enemy lines) and to rejoin the battalion just before contact with the enemy. Also used were five light regiments of infantry and dragoons (mounted infantry equipped with muskets, bayonets, long straight swords and entrenching tools) (Ropp, 82). Both line (for firing and engagement) and column (for maneuver and line-breaking; a column was composed of 40 men wide by 12 deep and could detach troops to form a square) formations were employed ("ordre mixte") by the French during the Republic (Ropp, 83). The Napoleonic formula also included (as well as almost every tactical method and weapon preference of the l8th century) the mutually supporting "ordre mixte". Coupled with the tactics of deploying numerically superior (fullest deployment of all means available} forces at decisive points, acting offensively and with extreme aggression (decisive victories were sought), and hunting down and annihilating the enemy, the combative French military doctrine would become nearly unbeatable. In addition to that French troops were the only ones in Europe , which were trained to live off the land (preservation by exploitation of natural resources and plunder). That enabled them to march and travel with virtually no supplies at all, while the other European armies were hindered by their long baggage trains (communications and scouting were not developed). The French were allowed accelerated mobility and enhanced fluidity over rough terrain, and could easily strike their opponents from wherever they pleased.
Other military concepts and practices which the French and many other European countries emphasized were those of centralization of command, use of reserves, and above all the most prized by generals concept of the "coup d' oeil". That term defined the amount and quality of tactical insight (knowing where and when to deploy) as well as the mixture of intuition and experience a general (l8th century was the age of the generals) possessed (Ropp, 35).
So far we have nearly omitted any reference to such armies as those of Russia and England since the examples of France and Prussia, being the best armies of their age, most vividly illustrate the way wars were fought in the eighteenth century. Later on in this work we will refer extensively to the British mastery of the seas. At this point where land forces are concerned it is enough to say that both British and Russian armies were tough professional forces adhering to the general military rules of the period. The British just abolished the third rank in their firing lines.
One of the most basic components of the armies of the eighteenth century was the cavalry. A magical, heroic aura seemed to surround those mounted warriors the valiant deeds of which usually passed into the realm of legends. Being the most rapid and versatile formation on the battlefield and being used for shock action in solid tactical units, the cavalry was prized and treasured by generals and looked upon by friends as the embodiment of protection ("Here comes the cavalry!"), and by foes as the dreaded nemesis. Usually, just the sound of the tremendous pounding and the sight of the ominous cloud of dust made by the approaching horses, coupled with the occasional trumpet signaling the charge, were enough to shatter the enemy's moral and transform him to easy prey. The Russian Cossacks (the appearance and performance of which left no European unimpressed), Murat's cavalry (the "bloodhounds" of Napoleon; used to track down and obliterate remainders of vanquished armies) and Napoleon's Currassiers (heavy cavalry units, equipped with body armor, steel helmets, and mounted on huge steeds trained to charge infantry under heavy fire) are some of the legendary cavalry formations that saw action in the eighteenth century European battlegrounds. The cavalry of Frederick the Great constituted about a fourth of his army (Paret, 100) and was much valued by its commander-in-chief. Other formations included the dragoons (mounted infantry) which we have already mentioned in this work. The cavalry was unsurpassed when it managed to achieve tactical surprise or when it assaulted the enemy's flank or rear. In addition, cavalry was also used in reconnaissance. In general though despite its heroic posture, the cavalry moved slowly but steadily towards decline. It would continue however to storm the battlefields up to the better part of the nineteenth century.
Napoleon called it "the soul of armies", Louis XIV "Ultima Ratio Regis" (the king's last argument) (O'Connell, 159) and even the army of the USSR addressed it as "the god of war". Indeed, artillery in the eighteenth century was a symbol of monarchical power plus it was the most lethal formation on the battlefield. Its primary role being to protect the infantry, artillery was widely and intensely used and reached new heights during the ages of the Old Regime, the Revolution and Napoleon (it was the French who were the most progressive artillerists). Again here, as we have mentioned before, major innovations were overlooked and possibilities were not exploited. Improvements though did occur. Frederick the Great introduced horse-drawn field artillery for shift of position during battle. He placed great importance on the discriminate and concentrated use of opening fire on the enemy's infantry lines so as to enable his own infantry to break through a specific point weakened under fire. The French artillery masters introduced the principle of interchangeable parts (standardization of equipment; also standardization of caliber was achieved), improved the accuracy of fire through better sights and enhanced the mobility of guns (3-ton pieces) by reducing their weight. On the battlefield, the popular two and three pounders were manually operated for direct infantry fire support (accuracy was not emphasized), while five and six ones were reserved for large scale tactical deployment (their range was half a mile; to reach maximum range guns were elevated at 45 degrees). Napoleon used his cannons massively. He believed that four guns corresponded to every thousand men and in almost every battle his artillery (in the concepts of which he was schooled) inflicted over 50% of the enemy casualties. As far as ammunition was concerned, solid shot was the standard, and case shot (usually filled with musket balls or nails) was used against cavalry and infantry in close ranges with devastating results (O'Connell, 160). If infantry was the Queen of Battles, artillery was undoubtedly the King of the Battlefield.
Apart from the classic components of eighteenth century warfare we have described and namely infantry, cavalry and artillery, and the tactics which accompanied them, there also existed some lesser known kinds of warfare most of which were appearing for the first time, and some of which in spite of their peculiarity at the time were destined to become established practices of regular and what in our century came to be known as special and irregular warfare.
In that way, Spain and Portugal offered the first examples of guerrilla warfare, the French Republic introduced the Balloon Corps, Frederick the Great was the forerunner of Blitzkrieg (he favored short, lively and surprising wars; his lightning attack on Silesia was proof to that; 200 years later Adolf Hitler would shock the world again along the same patterns with "Fall weiss"), and Peter the Great facing the Swedes, first made use of the "scorched earth" tactic, of "General Winter" (170Ó3-1709), and of the geographical trap his vast country provided (much later Josef Stalin would just add the monstrous T-34 tank).
Another major aspect of eighteenth century special warfare, and one of the favorite of nearly every military commander, was siegecraft. France possessed the best fortresses in Europe. Created much earlier by the master of fortifications Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, French fortresses and various fixed fortifications were destined to offer their protection even up to World War I. Therefore one can easily imagine the effort involved in besieging such a fortress with the then available means. Also the fact that sieges were carried out according to specific rules of engagement, made matters even more dissatisfactory. Yet, those very difficulties gave birth to new means of siege warfare and namely new weapons (most of which already existed but were only then appreciated). In that way, to the standard solid shot, exploding shells, explosive mines and shell-firing mortars were added (O'Connell, 160). Fortresses stood no chance. The only reason for which they usually suffered only minor damages, was the prevalence of the ever-present spirit of moderation and the rules of engagement it dictated.
Eighteenth century wars were mainly land wars. Navies although being the most enduring components of warfare in general, were reserved for secondary roles (especially that of France). Emphasis was placed on the continent and even considerable naval action (British convoy operations and amphibious expeditions) was overshadowed by the achievements of land formations. Yet, methodically and while everybody else concentrated on continental objectives (the French navy was demoralized and disorganized after the French revolution; it could never take advantage of the army's victories), the British managed to acquire the command of the sea. Gradually they built a fleet twice as large as that of France and through the Treaty of Utrecht (which offered them numerous strategic outposts) entered an era of worldwide maritime supremacy (Ropp, 52).
Being the largest naval force in the world, the Royal Navy was naturally the power which dictated the rules and tactics of naval warfare in the eighteenth century. Largely favoring blockade, the British avoided whenever possible, pitched naval battles and decisive engagements. Protection of Britain against invasion was the role towards the fulfillment of which the Royal Navy geared almost all its efforts. The largest fleet in the world (by 1783, 180 battleships!) (O'Connell, 165) also saw to that (the British emphasized power in numbers). More than once, the British navy - the supreme English weapon - was to masterly confront and effectively repel offensives against its homeland.
Battles at sea unfolded between equals. Not equally powerful navies (the Royal Navy had no match), but vessels of the same class and therefore, of the same capabilities (speed and firepower). A typical eighteenth century naval engagement would usually commence with lighter and swifter vessels ("ships below the line": frigates) delivering the opening rounds, and would continue and end with slower and heavier ships ("ships of the line": battleships) engaging the enemy at close ranges usually at the ratio of two ships to one. Close-in fighting was the basic element of naval operations, and all sea battles of the time were fought with combatants confronting each other at very short ranges (the British motto read: "How much nearer so much the better") (O'Connell, 163). It was the British of course, who made the most out of such situations by introducing their famous naval tactics of "line ahead" and "crossing the T" (O'Connell, 164). "Line ahead" became the standard naval formation of each and every eighteenth century European navy. That tactic called for the formation of an advancing file of sailing battleships (one ship closely and exactly behind the other) in order to face the enemy lengthwise, since almost all firepower was located along the sides of a ship. Once "line ahead" was formed the assembled battleships "crossed the T" in other words traversed the enemy's line of bearing, concentrating their broadside (and the lowest gunports which were the strongest) on the opposing formation. Even though inaccuracy of fire was a great problem, it was impossible to miss when firing from such a formation and at such a short distance. At that point of the battle fierce fighting begun, "yardarm to yardarm", until enemy ships were sufficiently weakened. The ammunition used, coupled with the spirit of moderation of the eighteenth century, ruled out sinking of enemy vessels. Sometimes weakened ships were outmaneuvered and raked at the weak ends, but most of the times ships were captured by boarding (the enemy ship's deck was transformed to a miniature battleground). After "striking their colors" many of these ships were still fit for service under their new masters.
In order to fully comprehend the magnitude of sea battles, one definitely has to examine the major naval weapon of the time and namely the massive sailing battleship. Made to look even larger when its sails were open, the battleship could easily intimidate an inferior naval vessel either by its size or by the thundering sound of its guns. Built out of oak wood, the battleship enjoyed considerable protection against enemy fire since its wooden sides were two feet thick. It was a mixed blessing though since oak wood tended to form lethal splinters under heavy fire. Also, battleships were extremely vulnerable below the waterline, yet it was very rare for a shot to be placed there. In any case though, battleships were some of the most durable vessels man has ever constructed. Horatio Nelson's "Victory" was forty years of age at the time of the Battle of Trafalgar and in general a well-maintained battleship could last for almost a century (O'Connell, 165). A great deal to that added also the fact that for more than 250 years naval technology was at a stalemate. Battleships were modeled after the "Sovereign of the Seas" which was built in 1637 and remained the standard until 1860 (O'Connell, 165).
The battleship's strength was judged by it's crew's strength and experience. Mostly though it was determined by its firepower. The more guns it carried, the more fighting power it possessed. The standard weapons load was seventy four solid shot-firing, smoothbore guns (smaller ships carried 38 guns) as well as a number of "smashers" (sawed-off version of standard long gun, which delivered a deadly hail of splinters at close ranges; also called "carronade").
As we have already mentioned, naval technology followed the path of land warfare technology, meaning that no breakthroughs were performed and although some amazing innovations were recorded, navies everywhere overlooked them and stuck with tradition. In that way, Bushell's submersible, and Fulton's four-man submarine and unpropelled, contact-activated torpedoes were set aside only, to return triumphantly in a much later age (O'Connell, 188).
We have almost witnessed, by closely studying the ways according to which land and sea warfare were executed in the eighteenth century, the persistence of the warriors of that age in adhering to tradition, and to weapons and tactics already tested in previous centuries. Truly the eighteenth century was the neoclassical age of warfare. It was as if time had stood still. For more than two hundred years, Europe was shaken by battles fought in virtually the same way and whatever daring attempts on improvement were made (throughout history progress passes through the battlefields; new technologies are first adopted by the military) were either ignored or even persecuted. Yet, the resulting stalemate was not a product of narrow-minded traditionalism but rather respect for human life and suffering. Overkill was avoided as much as possible, rules of engagement were kept, weapons of mass destruction were despised, prisoners of war were well-treated and noncombatants were spared. The ideas of Enlightenment were deeply embedded into even the most militaristic minds (Frederick the great befriended Voltaire). Wars were lost by those sides which were more moderate than others. Military engagements of course lacked nothing in ferocity, but wars are not determined solely on the battlefield. The warriors of the eighteenth century though, were unwilling to exploit other more brutal yet effective and efficient options. It was after all a time that sprang out of the ages of chivalry. And it was the last such period of military history. The next century would see the emergence of a new kind of warrior willing to achieve victory at any and all costs. A kind of military leader that would replace the eighteenth century's Enlightened warriors.
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