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The Dutch and the Greeks are geographically almost as far removed from each other as Europe allows. Reading the press in both countries on the problems which arose between Greece and FYROM, after the declaration of the latter's independence, gives the impression that the distance between these two members of the European Union is not only geographical. Whereas most of the leading Dutch newspapers rigorously condemned Greek policy towards FYROM, the Greek newspapers showed their indignance at another expression of anti-Greek feeling by the supposedly turcophile Dutch, culminating in a short though hardly effective boycot of Dutch products in Greece.
The leading question of this article however will not deal with the contents of Dutch press comments on the 'new Macedonian question' by which term I label the conflict between Greece and FYROM during the 1991-1995 period, but rather what views are expressed by Dutch historiography on the matter. Before doing so we must define what publications we reckon to belong to Dutch historiography, the more so as they are relatively small in number.
At the moment this article is written the 'new Macedonian question' or subjects related to it, are treated in a book (Detrez, 1992) and some thirteen articles in various periodicals. Some of these articles come down to short comments only, others are well written analyses. The criteria for including them in this article are that they must have been written by an expert, preferably a historian or a scholar well aware of the history of the area and they must have been published in a magazine seriously dealing with history, Modern Greek studies or foreign relations.
However limited Dutch historiography on our subject may be, it is of interest to see what scholarly views are expressed and how these relate to those of the journalists that play a major role in the construction of public opinion. Particularly since these were, with an odd exception, marching in line with the ranks of the British and German press against Greece.
Obviously none of the authors treat the 'new Macedonian question' as a new phenomenon, but all of them trace its roots back to the foundation of Tito's Yugoslavia immediately after World War II. Particularly Wim van Loon points out the importance of a historical perspective, since in his view history plays a dominant role in all conflicts in the Balkans. The importance of a relation between history and politics, according to Van Loon, is much more realized in the minds of Balkan politicians as in those of their Western counterparts, which is the cause of a rift between the former and the latter which should not be underestimated (Van Loon, 13).
With the founding of 'Macedonia' as an autonomous entity within Yugoslavia the Macedonian question entered an entirely new phase, as for the first time in history 'Macedonian' nationalism was allowed to develop freely, it was even officially encouraged with the aim of weakening Serbia on the one hand and by strengthening Yugoslavian claims on Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia on the other (Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 59; Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS 48/10, 488; Van Loon, 13; De Boel, 34). This second aspiration of Tito is seen as one of the reasons for his support of the Greek left in the civil war which devastated the country until 1949 (Koolschijn, 302).
When Yugoslav Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 the effects of the process of nation-building became evident. In the new state extreme nationalism had taken root in the shape of the VMRO-DPMNE headed by a young poet, Ljubko Georgievski. In the eyes of some of the authors the virulent nationalism preached by this party was one, perhaps the most important reason for the Greeks to grow alarmed at the prospect of an independent neighbour with the name Macedonia. VMRO-DPMNE called for the unification of Greek, Bulgarian and former Yugoslav Macedonia. An idea which, though it was not loudly expressed after the late fourties, according to Van den Heuvel, has never been officially abandoned by the Yugoslav Communist Party, although it recognized the Slavs of Yugoslav Macedonia as a nation (Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS 48/10, 489). Van den Heuvel also points out that the fact that 'Macedonia' was on good terms with Turkey made it a prime suspect in the eyes of Athens.
Van Loon does not mention the radicals in Skopje with so many words, but according to him there were two factors which helped to arouse Greek fears for the safety of its territorial integrity: persistent 'Macedonian' propaganda, which was largely the work of radical nationalists, and the use of Greek symbols by Skopje (Van Loon, 13). 'Macedonia,' says Van Loon, constituted a threat to stability in the Balkans by the simple fact that stronger states would be able to take advantage of its weakness. He sees the speedy recognition of the new state by Bulgaria and Turkey as an ominous sign. He does not give a clear answer to the question whether Greek fears were justified or not, but he states that whatever the answer might be, these fears played a major role in Greek policy making (Van Loon, 13). He also notes an internal danger to Greece: the fact that the Macedonia-crisis could stimulate the growth of radical nationalism, which could have a serious impact on the freedom of the press and the treatment of minorities (Van Loon, 14).
Koolschijn, like Van Loon, shows much understanding for the Greek position. Going back to the late forties he writes that the Greek civil war was encouraged by Tito with the specific aim of Yugoslavia laying hands on Greek Macedonia (Koolschijn, 302). Looking at the historical perspective he considers Greek sensitivities about the flag and the constitution of Skopje absolutely understandable. Like Van Loon and Klok he points out the effect of over forty years of propaganda emanating from Skopje and directed against Greece and like Klok he remarks that the Gligorov administration never reacted against this propaganda which continued after 1991 (Koolschijn, 303; Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 61).
Koolschijn stresses the importance of the VMRO-DPMNE in bringing the ancient phantoms of territorial claims back to life, while he accuses the government in Skopje of 'encouraging the nationalist fire' (Koolschijn, 303) Like Van Loon he sees FYROM as a destabilizing factor, particularly in view of Bulgaria which he thinks is still harbouring 'revisionist intentions' towards 'Macedonia.'
De Boel regards the refounding of the old VMRO in its new shape of VMRO-DPMNE as another step in the process of increasing 'Macedonian' nationalism, a phenomenon he dates back to the eighties. He points out the importance of the role of what he calls 'the absurd intolerance of the Slavo-Macedonians' towards Greeks making use of the name Macedonia, which in his opinion is rightfully Greek. He notes that after 1950 Yugoslav Macedonia pretended to be the one and only heir of the Ancient Macedonia of Philip and Alexander. According to De Boel both Belgrade and Skopje stressed again and again the existence of a 'Macedonian' minority in Greece and Bulgaria. In his view this was not only to divert attention from economic problems, but also to keep territorial claims alive. To preserve good relations with Yugoslavia the Greeks swallowed their anger and kept a low profile (De Boel, 34-36).
Detrez on the other hand strongly criticizes the Greeks for their treatment of the Slav Macedonian minority. However, despite this harsh treatment, and possibly because of it, he detects a strong Slav-Macedonian consciousness amongst some of the Slavs in Greek Macedonia. He views 'Macedonian' nationalism, inspired by the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and the negative prospect of having to live in a Serbian state as the main factors for Skopje's break-away from Yugoslavia. He is not impressed by Greek historical arguments against the name of the new state, though somewhat more by Greek fears that 'Macedonia' will use the Slav-Macedonian presence in Greek Macedonia as an argument for claims on Greek territory (Detrez, 1992, 149-161).
Looking at Greece Kapteijn and Klok stress the importance of the 'foreign factor' in Greek policy. For most of its existence Greece has been subjected to Great Power politics as well as to an almost continuous threat of attack from abroad (Kapteijn, 8). The 'foreign factor' has created a deep feeling of distrust in Greece, not only of its direct neighbours, but particularly of its own allies. The policy of the USA and NATO on the Cyprus-issue is perceived by the Greeks as directed against their interests and as proof of bad faith if not right-out betrayal. Since the late seventies therefore the Greeks show an inclination to follow their own way in foreign policy, sometimes regardless of their allies, which has brought them several times at loggerheads with the rest of the EU (Klok, 1994, 10-11).
Greek distrust of its neighbours and allies was heightened by the threat felt from the north and by the lack of understanding and support experienced as public opinion on the conflicts with FYROM in many W. European countries turned against Athens. This was very much the case in The Netherlands. Not knowing much about the historical background of Greek politics the Dutch press, with its innate inclination to rush to the aid of any country (except perhaps Serbia) which successfully presents itself as an underdog, criticised the Greeks strongly over 'Macedonia.' With the exception only of one or two journalists who upheld a dissident opinion, notably Frans van Hasselt, Athens correpondent of the NRC-Handelsblad.
Although Van den Heuvel recognized the existence in the past of a Yugoslav claim on Greek Macedonia he states in a post-scriptum to Koolschijn's article that present-day FYROM has abandoned this claim and that Greek policy towards it did not seem to be a very sensible one. He sees the policy of non-recognition and the 1994 embargo as destabilizing factors in the area (Van den Heuvel, 1994, IS 48/6, 304). Although Klok shows understanding for the boycot insofar as he thinks that, besides Greek frustration caused by the USA's recognition of FYROM and the need to satisfy public opinion, Skopje's intransigence was important in bringing it about, he tends to agree with Van den Heuvel that it was not a very sensible policy as it particularly damaged Greece's reputation abroad. On the other hand it appeared to be a factor in reaching a break-through in Greek - 'Macedonian' relations (leading to the interim-accord of 1995), together with the waning popularity of VMRO-DPMNE which gave the Gligorov administration some room to manoeuvre.
He also points out that 'Macedonia' did everything to present itself to Europe as the underdog which was bullied by Greece. This resulted in pressure being put on Greece by the EU to adopt a more lenient attitude towards its neighbour, who initially did little to improve the situation. This was mainly due to the popularity of the VMRO-DPMNE which was the largest opposition party at the time. Even though the EU at its meeting in Lisbon (June 1992) decided to back Greece, some members, including The Netherlands, remained critical of Athens. However, US and EU mediation brought about a small break-through in April 1993, when 'Macedonia' was admitted to the United Nations under the provisional name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Klok, 1996, SH 31/2, 61).
Van Loon writes that at first Greece's fierce opposition against the name of the new republic was considered to be exaggerated and unrealistic by the EU. Quite surprisingly the EU finally backed Greece, because, according to Van Loon, the future of a united Europe was not to be put at a risk (Van Loon, 13).
Kapteijn remarks that Dutch support for EU-recognition of 'Macedonia' meant that Greek distrust of Holland reached its maximum. This distrust originated from the 1986 Dutch presidency of the EU (then still EC), when The Hague took the initiative to re-activate relations with Turkey. To the annoyance of Greece the Dutch considered Turkey of great importance to the defense of Western-Europe. They regarded the Greek attitude towards 'Macedonia' as fanatic and nationalistic. The Dutch, who were under no threat from any neighbour, did not understand Greek feelings of national awareness and foreign threat, whereas the Greeks showed no understanding for the characteristical Dutch attitude of wanting to lecture the rest of the world. Even though, as Kapteijn pointedly remarks, this characteristic was the driving force behind Dutch efforts against the Greek junta in the 1967-74 period (Kapteijn, 9).
Greece's struggle against recognition of FYROM under the name Macedonia met in general with little sympathy in the Dutch press. Greece's appeal to history fell on deaf ears. Also the way it operated within the EU was characterized as some kind of blackmail and it was accused of endangering peace and stability in the region by bullying little 'Macedonia' to confirm to its wishes. Particularly the 1994 boycot was widely condemned.
Compared to this view the scholarly writings on the problem show a somewhat different attitude. Although there is no unanimous understanding for Greece's appeal to history, most of the writers do show understanding for Greek fears about its territorial integrity. Particularly the memory of the very real Yugoslavian territorial claims of the forties and the ongoing propaganda from Skopje carry weight.
Although none of the writers contest the right of FYROM to exist as an independent state, some are quite critical about the role of Skopje, attributing to it at least part of the blame for the escalation of the conflict, though showing some understanding for the difficult position of the Gligorov-administration. The role played by VMRO-DPMNE is generally viewed as a negative influence. That of the EU is noted as somewhat remarkable: despite fierce criticism of Greece by some EU-member, notably Italy and The Netherlands, the Union finally supported Greece but maintained pressure on Athens to adopt a more lenient attitude towards FYROM. EU mediation partly contributed to admission of Skopje to the UN.
There is some understanding for the Greek irritations which led to the 1994 boycot. However this measure is mainly viewed as having led to a considerable loss of Greek prestige, even though it contributed towards reaching the Interim Accord of 1994.
Few authors deal with the problem of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece. It is mainly Detrez who writes critically about Greek treatment of this minority, which is not recognized by the Greeks as such.
Finally there is some attention for the 'foreign factor' in Greek history and its effect on Greek foreign policy, while one author (Kapteijn) elaborates on the difference in perceptions and mentality of Greeks and Dutch, which might serve as an example for Greece's relations with the EU.
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