by

Demetris I. Loizos, B.A., M.A./M.Phil, D.HA

History Professor

 

"Great Britain and France have the most essential influence on the interest of this country [USA], as well commercial as political."[1] The British diplomat Hammond was right. American foreign policy in the mid-1790s acted as a boomerang to internal affairs when problems in foreign relations became issues in American politics. An outstanding example is the attempt of the French to intervene in the presidential elections of 1796 supporting the nomination of the francophile Jefferson.

           

The conflict between Great Britain and France in the 1790s and the political, economic, and cultural relations of the US with both countries created a triangle of interacting forces. The French declaration of war on Great Britain on February 1, 1793 became immediately a dilemma for American foreign policy protagonists, reinforcing the already existing differences in the internal political scene. The two political groups, the Federalists and the Republicans, took opposite positions in the managing of American foreign policy.[2]

 

The Federalists were interested in establishing order and stability and, therefore, although in the beginning they might have been favorable to the French Revolution, they were horrified by the execution of Louis XVI and the reign of terror, and came to back England. Their choice was influenced by the fact that they perceived England and its foreign policy to represent the forces of stability in contrast to the government of the mob in France. On the other hand, the Republicans emphasized liberty and they associated it with the French Revolution and its aftermath. Despite the situation in France during the 1790s, they supported that country in its conflict against England. In internal politics the cause of the political division was the reaction of the Republicans to the creation of a strong central government visualized by the Federalists. The Anglo-French war, therefore, provided a stage for both groups to exhibit their own political goals through a pro-British or pro-French foreign policy orientation.[3]

 

The war that began in 1793 created problems of neutrality for the US, which were associated with economic interests represented by the rights of neutrals at sea and, consequently, American trade. President Washington accepted Hamilton's advice and on April 22, 1793 proclaimed a neutrality that actually demonstrated to both England and France the American intention to remain in peace with those nations.[4]

 

Matters were complicated, however, because of the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce the US had signed with France. The two countries were committed to the practice of maritime principles which Great Britain never recognized and often violated. The most important principle was that free ships make free goods, and the attempt on the American part to enforce it might have meant war with England. On the other hand, the non-enforcement policy meant to many a violation of the French alliance and might have meant an awkward diplomatic situation with France. Hamilton and his Federalist pro-British friends influenced Washington to send one of them (John Jay) to London to investigate the possibility of a settlement with Great Britain. However, the President had foreseen the effect of this mission on Franco-American relations and the suspicion of the French government and decided to send as minister to that country James Monroe, the pro-French Republican senator from Virginia.[5]

 

The treaty that was signed with England on November 19, 1794 (The Jay Treaty) did not include the principles by which Americans had bound themselves with the French: free ships make free goods; freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents in non-contraband goods. Many Americans viewed the abandonment on the part of the government of its maritime principles as a violation of the obligations of their country towards France and the Treaty of 1778.[6]

 

Apart from the internal reaction against the Jay Treaty, the French, who were directly harmed by its provisions, saw in it the breaking off of the Franco-American relations on the part of the US and at the same time a political and economic rapprochement of that country to their own enemy, England. "Tous les jours J’en acquiers de nouvelles", wrote Adet, the French Minister to the US, to his superiors, "et tous les jours je vois le Gouv. Américain protéger ouvertement l’Angleterre."[7] Both Adet and the French government perceived the Treaty as a declaration of hostilities between their country and the US and, in their view, their suspicions were confirmed. Washington signed it in November 1795, several months after the conclusion of the agreement. The triumph of British politicians, they thought, was complete. The reaction of the Directory, the French government, was strong and as Monroe reported from Paris "it considered the alliance between us [US and France] as ceasing to exist from the moment the treaty was ratified."[8] The French opinion about the treaty is understandable taking into account the troubled internal politics and the fear that an American alliance with England might have been fatal for the outcome of the Franco-British war.

 

In early 1796, the French placed much emphasis on the Treaty and all their complaints were focused on this matter. In the beginning, French officials detected the unfriendliness of the American government and later on came back with specific grievances. In their opinion, Americans acknowledged the pretension of the British to blockade French colonies and France itself by the force of a proclamation; they allowed the admission of English war vessels into American ports; they sacrificed "knowingly and evidently" the rights of neutrality.[9]

 

While Jay was in England in 1794 negotiating the Anglo-American treaty, Monroe was instructed to "remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission to London" and to assure the French that the American envoy was "forbidden to weaken the engagements between this country and France."[10] In this respect, therefore, Monroe replied in March 1796 to the French complaints. He stated that the Franco-American treaty of 1778 did not forbid the enemies of France to enter American ports unless they entered with prizes (captured vessels and cargoes). Most important of all, Jay's Treaty was a necessity from an economic point of view because of the specific character of American trade and the need to enlarge the freedom of commerce and diminish the list of contraband.[11] Essentially, it was a point by point answer which did not, however, satisfy the French part, although they did not show their intentions immediately after the reply.

 

The French government delayed an explanation on the American reply, a fact that alarmed Washington. The President even proposed to send an Envoy Extraordinary to France to ask for explanations. On the other hand, Washington was convinced by the delay that "more smoke than fire [was] likely to result from the representation of the French discontents on account of [the] treaty with Great Britain."[12] He was mistaken. In October 1796 the French Minister replied with a letter that included a decree of the French Republic which had been issued three months earlier, on July 2nd. According to the decree "the flag of the republic [would] treat the flag of neutrals in the same manner as they [would] suffer it to be treated by the English."[13] Adet's answer was simultaneously presented to the government of the United States and published by the French Minister in American newspapers. His goal was to show to the American people why France was obliged to react to Jay's Treaty and thus to influence the result of the coming elections.

 

The American government was disturbed by the publication of the letter and by the fact that, although the decree was issued in July, Monroe was assured by the French government in August that no order had been issued for the seizure of neutral vessels.[14] Adet's letter, its content and the way in which it was communicated to both the government and the public, confirmed the suspicion that France wanted a change in the administration of the United States by the 1796 elections at the latest. Washington had already detected the reliance of France on Republicans since June and had written about it to Hamilton.[15]

 

At last, in November, Adet made clear his views and grievances on the Jay Treaty. He stated that England was given the exclusive right of the carriage of articles for the equipment, construction, and armament of vessels. Therefore, the American government could not claim that it had maintained an "equal neutrality" between France and England. Adet expressed his hostile feelings for Monroe's mission which, as he wrote, was to remove "the fears of the French government on the mission of [Jay]."[16]Adet and his government in Paris felt cheated because in their view Americans tried to establish good relations with Great Britain at the expense of the economic, and at that time vital because of the war, interest of France.

 

The French government saw in Jay's mission the pro-British sentiments of the Federalists and, consequently, of Washington's administration. When, despite the opposite popular feeling, both the House and the President ratified the Treaty, they were certain that this Government was in favor of the British instead of neutral or, what they would have liked better, pro-French. However, they also felt deceived because of the American Minister's role in Paris.

 

Ironically, Monroe was also mistrusted by the Federalist government because they thought he would do his best to protect the interests of France toward America as opposed to those of Britain toward the US. They had a good example to prove it. When the Anglo-French war broke out in 1793 Monroe supported the French alliance and favored a policy of neutrality for the US which was definitely advantageous to France. The federalists could also point to the reception of Monroe in Europe. The French were delighted with his appointment in 1794 as Minister of the US in Paris and Fauchet, the French minister in the United States, described him as a "true friend of liberty."[17]

 

When Monroe arrived in France in the Fall of 1794 he was preoccupied with the execution of his instructions: to assure the French that Jay's negotiations in Britain were not an attempt of the Americans to turn pro-British. However, as he wrote to Madison, although the French government trusted him they had no confidence to the Federalist Administration. It seems that at the beginning he was successful in removing the distrust of the French for the latter.[18] His communications to the French Committee of Public Safety appeared to be honest and he assured them that he would keep them informed about all the details of Jay's mission. "I cannot believe that an American Minister would ever forget the connection between the US and France," he wrote to the Committee.[19]

 

However, when Jay's Treaty became known to the United States, Monroe was denied a summary of its content because that might prove at once that what he had been telling the French was actually dead letter. He wrote to the Secretary of State that the delay of the treaty kept French suspicion alive and that such a behavior "always weakens the bonds of friendship." Until early 1795 Monroe believed that the American government was in no way going to weaken the  alliance with France. But when he was criticized by Randolph for his friendly position toward the French government he was "surprised that [he] had to make a secret use of all the information [he] had about the treaty. In other words," he wrote to Madison, "I would become the instrument of that party here, thereby putting in its hands my own reputation to be impeached hereafter in the course of events. They were deceived if they supposed I was such a person."[20]

 

Hereafter Monroe was convinced that the government in Philadelphia did not trust him because of his political position. Therefore, he was not going to follow their instructions. When Jay refused to communicate a copy of the Treaty, Monroe appeared before the Committee of Public Safety and explained Jay's motives for withholding the communication. His move excited uneasiness in the French government. Monroe justified his action to the Secretary of State writing that he did not want to expose himself "to the suspicion of having known from the beginning the purpose of Mr. Jay's treaty and [...] withholding it from them [French]" while he was using all the means to "impress them with a contrary belief."[21]

 

When he finally read an outline of the treaty he informed the French government that it contained nothing that could give them uneasiness. He also assured them that if in any way it weakened the Franco-American friendship it "would certainly be disapproved in America."[22] Monroe did everything to present the picture of a trustworthy America. He believed that even if the treaty was against the interest of France, being negotiated by a pro-British politician, it would certainly be rejected in the House. Consequently, he continued his policy of honesty communicating to the Committee in France all the problems he had with the sending of the treaty by Jay. He was convinced that Jay acted independently of Washington and wrote to Madison: "I believe I am free in the estimation of the [American] gov't from unjust suspicions."[23] It appears from Monroe's correspondence that during his mission in Paris he had been writing his thoughts about the Franco-American relations to his friend Madison rather than to his superior, the Secretary of State, in Philadelphia.

 

Since the beginning of the crisis he had been expressing to the State Department only his fears. In February 1796, though, he was alarmed when he was informed that the Directory considered the alliance ceasing to exist because of the treaty and that it "would appoint an Envoy Extraordinary" to attend and present the French view to the American government.[24] The following months the French continued expressing their dissatisfaction to Monroe about Jay's treaty and its consequences. Monroe, was finally convinced in mid-1796 that only a change in the American administration and a new treaty would tie again France and the United States. "I most earnestly hope that Mr. Jefferson will be elected and that he will serve," he wrote to Madison. Monroe viewed Jefferson's election to the presidency as the only means to restore the relations with France.[25] He also believed that it was the pro-British sentiments of the Federalist administration that hampered the relations with France and that a new government under the presidency of the old friend of the country, Jefferson, would restore the status quo ante and dissolve the crisis at once.

 

The Federalist government in Philadelphia, however, was very much dissatisfied with the way Monroe had executed his instructions. In June 1796, Pickering summarized all his grievances toward the American Minister's actions. He wrote to him that since October 1796 he had been expressing his fears about the effects of Jay's Treaty on Franco-American relations but he had done nothing to prevent them using the instructions of the State Department.[26] This was the beginning of the end for Monroe's appointment to Paris. Hamilton immediately wrote to Washington to express his bad feelings about Monroe and his contacts in France.[27] Hamilton and Jay foresaw the problems Monroe could create in the relations of the US with both France and England and calculated that it was the right time to move. The State Department was also dissatisfied and it would not be difficult for Washington to be persuaded to remove Monroe from his position.[28] The President, though, had already decided to recall the American Minister at Paris. He wrote to Pinckney, offering him the position:

 

            The situation of Affairs and the interest of this country as they relate to France, render it indispensably necessary that a faithful Organ near that government able and willing to explain its views and to ascertain those of France should be immediately fill the place of our present Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris.[29]

In late August 1796 Monroe was informed of his replacement.[30]

Although many in France might have been glad for the replacement of Monroe since they believed that he tried to keep the terms of the treaty secret, Adet, the French Minister in Philadelphia, had a different view. The President, he wrote to his superiors, should not accept the opinion of the "Faction Britanique" at a time when an American Minister known for his attachment to liberty was needed in Paris.[31]

No doubt, Monroe was not a traitor. His attachment to France would not coincide with the sacrifice of American interests. He was against the policies of the Federalist government and he believed that he was obliged to do his best to prevent the breaking off of Franco-American relations. "I can not well mention to you the difficulties I have had to encounter to prevent this gov't from taking some very unfriendly steps towards us,"[32] wrote to Clinton. Also, he himself hoped and tried to convince the French government that the elections of 1796 might change the whole situation if a pro-French President (Jefferson) was elected.

 

The idea of a French indirect intervention in the presidential elections of 1796 was forwarded in early 1795 by Fauchet, the French Minister in Philadelphia. He had detected the "indifference visible" of the Federalist government towards France with its plan to neutralize the French political influence. He believed that some kind of action should be taken in order to maintain French influence in the United States. Fauchet also claimed that the British influence was significant in America through speakers, newspapers, and pamphleteers.[33]

 

Fauchet believed that the division of American people on capital subjects and the opposition of a major portion of the population to the governmental policies would make it easier for France to attract the dissatisfied citizens. Moreover, he stated that both parties looked for foreign connections. He also assured his superiors that the supporters of France were numerous, they had influence, and constituted a major portion of the American nation. Therefore, if France could use its influence to change the individuals who formulated the US policy, the threat of an Anglo-American approach would be removed.[34]

 

Fauchet was replaced in June 1795 by Adet, the new French Minister in the United States. Fauchet had invented the idea of intervention because of Jay's mission in England which he interpreted as a turn of the American government towards England. Adet repeated in his reports the same fears and denounced clearly American contacts with Great Britain. It was a mistake for France to believe that Americans were devoted to its cause against the British; it was a mistake to believe that Americans were for liberty since they negotiated secretly with the British.[35]

 

Adet tried to convince the Committee of Public Safety in Paris that the American people did not have the same opinion as their government about France. The government feared public opinion and it did not reveal the terms of the treaty to the people. Therefore, it was to the interest of France to influence the political situation to its own advantage.[36]

 

In the meantime, an outline of the treaty was published in the newspapers and many Americans throughout the nation were opposed to it. When Washington was informed of the people's reaction he wrote to the Secretary of State that he was alarmed on "acct [account] of the effect it may have on, and the advantage the French gov. may be disposed to make of the spirit which is at work."[37]

 

The effect that the treaty had on Jefferson's friends is revealed in the writings of Madison. He was convinced that the Federalist party was a British-influenced party "ready to sacrifice [...] as well the dearest interest of [American] commerce as the most sacred dictates of National honour."[38] The Republicans viewed the Jay Treaty as a treason on the part of the Federalists and they tried to block it in the House of Representatives. They thought that at that point the Federalists might have been serving the French interests in the United States.

 

When Washington ratified the treaty, Adet wrote to Paris that the President was "un de ces enfans produits par l' enthousiasme populaire," and he could not perceive what was good and what was wrong.[39] Adet's reports had convinced Charles Delacroix, the French foreign minister, that President Washington was the real obstacle in Franco-American relations and, consequently, the French should favore Jefferson's nomination for the presidency. Thus, he believed, the French influence would be restored in the United States as he would be supported by the people who were now opposing Jay's treaty. From 1793 to 1797, the French government distinguished the attitude of the Federalist government from that of the American people. They saw Washington's administration being pro-British and in contrast to the pro-French sentiments of the people.[40] The different attitude between the government and the people was continuously noted by Adet in his reports. "Si le gouvernement Américain est peu Ami de nôtre révolution et de la République, le majeure du peuple ne partage pas les sentiments."[41] Similarly, the Republicans believed that the people's opinion was largely pro-French. Thus, the use of the Jay treaty and Hamilton's pro-British policy as campaign issues would be on their advantage.[42]

 

Adet had connections with influential people in Massachusetts and they were willing to support the French cause. Moreover, the French Minister reported that the Federalist nominee, John Adams (Jefferson's nominee rival), was absolutely pro-British and, therefore, they had to continue their efforts in favor of Jefferson.[43]

 

Adet figured out that an appropriate way to intervene in the elections of 1796 would be the publication of documents that would influence public opinion. At the most crucial moment, in November, when the States were choosing their electors, the French Minister accompanied his announcement of suspension of his functions with a long review that was supported by documents of the Franco-American quarrel over American neutrality. A summary of the content was published in the newspapers and, as it was expected, arouse public feelings.[44]

 

When Washington read the newspapers and was informed of Adet's action, could not decide whether it was the Minister's initiative or he had acted after instructions from the Directory, the government in France. Recent historical research has proved, though, that the Directory had actually approved and guided Adet's actions in Philadelphia.[45] Hamilton wrote to the President to prevent a reply through the newspapers. "The sooner the Executive gets out of the newspapers the better."[46] Hamilton foresaw the dangerous outcome of a Franco-American quarrel through the newspapers. The elections would be definitely influenced one way or another from the replies of both parts. Moreover, Hamilton feared a pro-French turn of the voters because of the use of the treaty by the French as a campaign issue.

 

In late November 1796 Adet informed Paris that France's partisans believed that the publication of the documents would have a great effect on the election of the President. They insisted that the Americans would vote for Jefferson. But the French minister was not able to verify their views: "Je ne sais si leurs conjectures se vérifieront." Adet was surprised to find out that the majority of the electors were in favor of John Adams, who was finally elected President. He thought that it was the British who had influenced them and could not think "que de pareilles manoeuvres auraient ete employées par la faction Britannique pour faire tournes les élections a son avantages."[47] The French Minister had the polarized view that either France or England would influence the 1796 American elections. He and his superiors in France could not perceive that the Americans had their own foreign policy despite the pro-British or pro-French sentiments of their leaders.

 

The French government was convinced that if it showed its opposition to Washington's administration because of Jay's treaty, this action would help the Republicans win the presidential contest.[48] President Washington had expressed his own feelings about French maneuvers since May 1796 when he wrote to Hamilton: "We are an Independent Nation and act for ourselves. [...] We will not be dictated to by the Politics of any Nation under Heaven, farther than Treaties require of us."[49] Washington expected some kind of French reaction but he could not think of the course of the events and the threat of a Franco-American war.

 

In his Farewell Address, he made a successful connection of the internal political division (Federalists-Republicans) with foreign influences. Washington's Address was actually written by Hamilton who edited the first draft and guided the President to emphasize foreign intervention in American politics. Washington, already at the time a myth for many Americans, was the nation's father and his speech was America's voice to its citizens. In his Farewell, he emphasized that party division "opens the door to foreign influence and corruption [...]. Thus, the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another." His references to French intervention must have made a profound impression to the people. It was like the old wise father who talked to his children. Hamilton's influences and ideas, however, are apparent in the following part: "A patriotic attachment of one Nation for another produces [...] the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in case where no real common interest exists." It is Hamilton here who speaks. He justified the Anglo-American rapprochement versus the Franco-American alliance. It appears as a premature Realpolitik where friendly sentiments between two peoples or two nations should not necessarily determine the foreign policy of both to one another.

 

Washington, indirectly, justified the replacement of Monroe in Paris and condemned Republican connections with France. The attachment of one nation for another, he wrote, "gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens [...] facility to betray or sacrifice the interest of their country without odium, sometimes with popularity." He also justified the Federalist policy toward England. The President claimed that "excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side and severe to veil and even second the acts of influence on the other."[50]

 

Washington's Farewell Address touched upon a variety of subjects. However, the part in which he referred to political parties and foreign influences was to warn Americans about the dangers they would face in the coming elections. It was both a political warning and a testament. On the other hand, Washington used his authority, his position, and his appeal to the people to influence the outcome of the 1796 elections. He was not impartial and he could not be, since he had already pursued a pro-British policy in accordance to the "Hamiltonian system".

 

Hamilton was a protagonist in the Federalist, anti-French political war. Since June 1796 he had detected how serious the situation was and wrote to Wolcott: "the gov. must play a skillful card or all is lost."[51] His purpose was to use any means available and exclude Jefferson from the presidency. "We have everything to fear," he wrote, "if this man comes in."[52]

 

The Federalists, therefore, attacked the French alliance and interference in domestic politics claiming that Adet and the Directory wished to draw the United States into war.[53] A series of articles published by Hamilton (he used a pseudonym) in The Minerva forwarded the Federalist counter-attack. The French were aggressive since instead of using the "language of friendship" they used the threat of complaints. Their primary aim was to influence the elections of 1796. On the other hand, the American politician tried to influence public opinion by claiming that the retirement of Washington left a vacuum in American politics which should be filled by "a majority in the House of Representatives of a character truly American.[54] Hamilton warned the Americans that it was their responsibility to make sure that Washington would be replaced by a person or a House loyal to their interests and not influenced by foreign powers.

 

Adet and the Directory, however, had miscalculated the ultimate effect of their attempts to influence the results of the American elections in 1796. Their open support for the Republican party made Jefferson appear to Americans as if he was the pawn of France. This very fact was successfully used by the rival party in order to denounce foreign intervention in American politics and was stressed in Washington's Farewell Address and Hamilton's articles.[55]

 

Despite French maneuvers Jefferson was not elected president. His rival, Adams, undertook the presidency while Jefferson became vice-president, according to the system then in effect. As Adet wrote back home, friends of the French cause were glad with Jefferson's election. The French Minister himself, however, was aware of the fact that Jefferson would have little power ("peu d' influence") in the actual administration.[56]

 

From Jefferson’s correspondence in December 1796 it is apparent that he did not like the idea of becoming a president. "My name [...] was again brought forward without concert or expectation on my part."[57] Other evidence, though, point to the opposite direction. Although Jefferson did not have any contacts with the French officials he was very well informed about the Franco-American relations. Monroe provided him either directly or through other friends with information concerning the political situation. His only responsibility, therefore, for the French intervention was that he knew all the maneuvers of Monroe in Paris, of his friends in the United States, and of Adet in Philadelphia and did nothing to prevent French influence.[58] This might prove that he was interested in the presidency although he did not want the Americans to understand that he would be elected President by foreign help. One could not say the same thing for John Adams, though, who was delighted with the idea of him being the next president. In January 1796 he had some information of Washington's retirement and he wrote to his wife: "the consequences to me is very serious and I am not able as yet to see what my duty will demand of me."[59] Although he was aware of French maneuvers he was not sure whether he would allow them to influence the outcome of the elections.[60]

 

Despite all their attempts, Adet and the French officials failed to influence the Presidential elections of 1796 to their advantage. In contrast, they may have influenced them to the advantage of the Federalists. The French decision to intervene in American politics was made when Jay's mission in London and the eventual conclusion of the Anglo-American Treaty in November 1794 were made known. The subsequent acceptance of the treaty by the Federalist government along with the opposition of the Republicans and their followers convinced the French government that this could help in the election of pro-French Jefferson. However, matters were further complicated because of Monroe's role in Paris. The result was that the American Minister convinced neither the French nor the Federalist government for his honest goals and, thus, he was denounced by both. The American reaction to the uncomfortable situation was Washington's Farewell Address in which the French government saw the means for the disintegration of the Franco-American relations. France failed to influence the 1796 elections in the United States because for the Americans a pro-French government might have meant involvement of their country in the Anglo-French conflict.

 

 

NOTES