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After January 1991 (the ousting of President Barre) intense clan clashes broke out in most parts of Somalia including the capital, Mogadishu. The most important power struggle was between the faction of Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the faction of the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The fighting resulted in great chaos and over half of Somalia's population (4.5 million people) was threatened by severe malnutrition. In addition, almost one million Somalia have fled in other neighboring states. There was a great need for humanitarian assistance. By March 1991, the United Nations was fully engaged. In December 1991, the secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar decided to take an initiative for restoring peace in Somalia, and he sent the Under-Secretary-general for Political Affairs James O. C. Jonah to visit the area.
The results of this visit were reported to the new secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who consulted with the Security Council on the `appropriate course of action.' By its Resolution 733, on 23 January 1992, the Security Council `strongly urges all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire,' `decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise.' (United Nations' Annual Yearbook, 1992, p. 200) Furthermore, it requested the secretary-general (in co-operation with the Secretary Generals of OAU and LAS) to contact immediately all the parties involved in the conflict. On 3 March 1992, after intensive negotiations involving the United Nations, the two rival Somali factions signed an `Agreement on the Implementation of a cease-fire.'
On 23 March, an international `technical team' arrived in Mogadishu in order to prepare a plan for a possible United Nations mechanism to monitor the agreed cease-fire, and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Resolution 746) (United Nations Peacekeeping, 1994, p. 99). On 24 April 1992, by adopting Resolution 751, the Security Council `decides to establish under its authority... a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)' and `welcomes the intention expressed by the Secretary-general... to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Somalia.' (United Nations' Annual Yearbook, 1992, p. 203) Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed as the United Nations Special Representative and he left for Somalia on the 1st of May. On 24 August, the Secretary-general submitted a new report to the Security Council, including urgent steps that had to be taken in order to prevent a hunger escalation. Four days later, the Security Council, by its Resolution 775, approved the report and authorized an additional deployment of up to 3,000 security troops for increasing the strength of UNOSOM. (United Nations Chronicle, December 1992, p. 5). In September, the Under-Secretary-general for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, led a 100-Day Action Program for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance. However, the situation continued to deteriorate, and on 26 October 1992, Mohammed Sahnoun resigned. Ismat Kittani was going to replace him as the new Special Representative for Somalia.
On 29 November, the Secretary-general submitted a new report (asked by the Security Council) where he outlines five options for creating the appropriate conditions for the `uninterrupted delivery of supplies.' On 3 December 1992, the Security Council adopted (unanimously) the Resolution 794, where `acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-general and Member States... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.' (United Nations' Annual Yearbook,1992, p. 210). The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was going to `feed the starving, protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction.' (United Nations Chronicle, March 1993, p.13). From 4 to 15 January 1993, the Secretary-general convened an informal meeting between 14 Somali political movements in order to prepare a national reconciliation conference.
Three agreements were concluded: first, a General Agreement; second, an agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; third, an agreement on the creation of an ad hoc committee which would set the agenda for the conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-general recommended the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, by pointing out that `despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been 2 established in Somalia.' (United Nations Peacekeeping,1994 p.105). In addition, on 26 March, the Security Council, by adopting Resolution 814, decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM II. A few days before, the Secretary-general appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia. As agreed at the January 1993 informal conference, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia took place in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The leaders of the Somali political movements signed an agreement which comprised four parts: `disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property, and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms (ibid, p.108). However, on 5 June 1993, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 54 were wounded, 10 were missing and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops continued. Moreover, the October 1993 incidents, when a US helicopter pilot was captured and bodies of US soldiers were subject to humiliating treatment, forced President Clinton to announce the intention of the US to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. On 18 November 1993, the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II for six months, until the 31st of May 1994.
According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on 3 December 1992, the Security Council by its Resolution 794, `established a precedent in the history of the United Nations: it decided for the first time to intervene militarily for strictly humanitarian purposes.' (Ghali, 1993, p.148) The secretary-general had stressed the fact that Somalia presented a `special challenge' and new innovative methods dealing with humanitarian and political situation had to be explored. As Makinda claims, the Secretary-general `saw an opportunity to test his new ideas about peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Makinda,1993, p.184). UNOSOM, as New Zealand stated, was a `landmark step' in the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping. The question resulting in why the United Nations did not engage in the Somali crisis earlier, at a time when a possible intervention might have had better results in reducing the intensity of the conflict. The Great Powers have shown great reluctance to focus on Somalia, `as for months tiny Cape Verde offered a more ambitious agenda for action in the Security Council than did the United States.' (Clark, 1992, p.116) In fact, the Security Council's policy was so reluctant that made Boutros-Ghali to charge that `a naked double-standard was being applied by members more concerned with "the rich man's" war in the former Yugoslavia. (Trevor,1992, p. 5) The United Nations mobilization on Somalia's problem came seven months after the Security Council's initial consideration. United Nations relief agencies also were too delayed. As Clark points out, `even Save the Children (UK), a relatively small private relief agency, delivered more food to Somalia than UNICEF did in 1992.' (Clark,1992, p.116) In addition, the United Nations Development Program did not spend $68 million for Somalia because of a lack of a signature from a non-existent Somali government. (Flint,1992, p. 6) Finally, the first United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in mid-1992.
The Secretary-general wanted to `carry out a major military intervention to demonstrate to Western nations that the United Nations needed a rapid deployment force.' (Makinda,1993, p.185) However, Mohammed Sahnoun, the first Special Representative to Somalia, had his reservations and he argued that before such deployment an agreement between the rival factions was needed. After criticizing the United Nations operation publicly, Sahnoun resigned in October 1992, because he refused to deal with `the bureaucrats and nomenclatura at headquarters.' (cited in Stevenson,1993, p.148) According to Stevenson, it was a pity that Sahnoun `was not given the chance to see his work to its conclusion... four months of arduous and fruitful diplomacy has been undone with one public statement from New York... humble pragmatism would have dictated tolerating Sahnoun for the sake of both the Somalia and, ultimately, the United Nations itself.' (Stevenson,1993, pp.147-8, p.153) Had the United Nations not fired Sahnoun, maybe the later American military initiative would have been unnecessary, since he did not believe in military solutions, and he had argued that `wherever there's oppression or a violation of human rights, the secretary-general must take the initiative of sending wise men very quickly.' (cited in Stevenson,1993, p.154) Sahnoun was replaced by Kittani, a man whose policies were `diametrically opposite' to those of Sahnoun, and a man who did not try to understand the Somali mind. `Hectoring threats, as a substitute for diplomacy, and a conviction that United Nations military enforcement of its policies as the only solution' (Drysdale,1994, p. 5) characterized Kittani's policies.
Apart from Sahnoun's replacement, `the bureaucrats and the nomenclature of the headquarters' failed to offer a good guidance and misjudged, most of the time, the situation. The United Nations has a limited capacity of conducting large-scale operations, especially `where a stable peace does not exist on the ground.' (Kingsbury,1994, p. 37) In missions that contain a great level of complexity, the adequacy on the United Nations' machinery is called into question. In late 1992, leading figures of UNOSOM had significant disagreements with New York's headquarters. (Sahnoun was the greatest example). However, not only leading figures, but also the actions of some contingent commanders had effects in `weakening the integrity of UNOSOM's military command structure.' (cited in United Nations Chronicle, December 1993, p. 26) The Secretary-general was referring mainly to disputed between the Italian officers in Mogadishu and commanders of UNOSOM II over the subjects of military operations in the city. It is true, that many of the officials lacked the professional capability needed for such operations. Even in cases of officers who did a good job, internal disagreements did not allïù them to be taken seriously. This was the case with the Brigadier commander of the Pakistani contingent, who had warned General Montgomery that `the planned inspection of weapons at the site of Radio Mogadishu was politically sensitive and dangerous,' (Drysdale,1994, p.179) and the later `catastrophic' incident proved him correct. Moreover, faulty intelligence gathering was the normal case.
Finally, the accusations of misguiding and mishandling the situation reached the very top, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He was positive about the American plan of intervention, and he had declared that `such a force could obtain stability very quickly.' (cited in Bolton,1994, p. 59) Furthermore, he was accused of having, at some point, absolutely `sweeping' powers `to arrest, detain, prosecute, try and punish without so much as a verdict of a thorough-going independent inquiry to establish the facts, should have at least respected the principles of habeas corpus.' (Drysdale,1994, pp.189-90) He was even accused of not being neutral, since `he had been a personal friend of ex-president Barre and was thus biased against those who overthrew Barre.' (ibid, p. 56)
`UNOSOM II have demonstrated what seems likely to happen in theater if a peace-keeping force crosses the impartiality divide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its security. The force's resources will then become even more devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall campaign aim.' (cited in Berdal,1994, p. 44)
UNOSOM, at the beginning, was intended as a peace-keeping operation. In the words of Boutros-Ghali: `it would not deploy without the agreement of the de facto authorities at each location where it was to operate and it would not use force except in self-defense...' (cited in Greenwood,1993, p. 37) However, this proved impossible in practice, and the situation deteriorated, having as a result the adoption of `more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia.' (ibid) Resolution 794 provided for peace enforcement without even the pretense of relying on the consent of a government of Somalia. During the debate on the Resolution, the Council members based their decision on the `exceptional' circumstances of the situation. However, `although the situation in Somalia had an international element as a result of the threats to UNOSOM and... the flow of refugees to neighboring states, there was nothing comparable to the threats to the security of neighboring states which existed in the case of Iraq and Liberia.' (Greenwood,1993, p. 38) John Drysdale accuses directly the United Nations for `partisan policy and practice, and the ill-advised pursuit of the doctrine of peace-enforcement,' `unhelpful, if not disastrous in Somalia because it would inevitably alter the balance of political power between clans and sub-clans involved.' (Drysdale,1994, p. 2 and pp.104-105) Little by little, UNOSOM started to get involved in clan politics and thus, to appear as a part of the problem rather than the solution. This was evident especially after the Pakistani incident at a time that the United Nations started to retaliate. (Berdal,1994, p. 42 and Makinda,1993, p.184)
As Martin Wight put it: `The vital interests of a state... are what it thinks them to be and not what another power says them to be.' (cited in Berdal,1994, p. 30) Peacekeeping means a `consent-based set of activities' and not imposing solutions by coercive means. One of the most important concepts in international relations is the concept of national sovereignty. On the other hand, someone can ask: `Does it follow that when a government massacres its ïùç people, or when the people of a state are threatened with starvation or other disaster and the government of that state refuses international aid, the international community must remain an essentially passive spectator? (Greenwood,1993, p. 34)
For Boutros Boutros-Ghali there was no such thing as `absolute and exclusive' sovereignty. The most essential is to safeguard the rights of the people internationally, and thus, the most important principle has become `the Universal Sovereignty.' Somalia could be the `experiment' to prove or disprove his doctrine. However, any use of coercive means without the consent of the locals is a gamble. Especially in Somalia, it was proven a great mistake. (Drysdale,1994, pp. 83-84 and p.165) The locals came to see the United Nations (especially the Americans) `more as colonizers than as saviors.' (Stevenson,1993, p.140) This was due mainly to the fact that they regarded the force as `US-inspired.'
The United Nations did not have the military capacity for carrying out peace enforcement, and therefore the Secretary-general had to ask for help from the United States. There had been much criticism on the US leading role in the operations. (Evans,1993, pp.144-145) In the summer of 1993, Conor Cruise O'Brien described the relationship between the US and the United Nations: `The US associates itself with the various United Nations operations but on its own terms , according to its own agenda and conserving its autonomy, while nominally acting under the authority of the United Nations.' (cited in Berdal,1994, p. 47) In fact, some of the US diplomats pursued simply the best interests of the US, and they regarded the United Nations interests as secondary. This was the case with Ambassador April Glaspie, who took over Kouyate's functions in April 1993. She promoted US interests and she followed policies which were against the spirit of the United Nations principle of neutrality. (Drysdale,1994, p. 3 and p. 8)
The conducting of military operations also raised questions about who is giving the orders. The Americans dominated completely UNOSOM's II command. Its commander General Bir from Turkey, was nominated by the US; his deputy, Major General Montgomery was an American; at this time, the Special Representative in Somalia was also an American, Admiral Jonathan Howe. This domination created great problems when other states felt that they should have a `greater say' in UNOSOM II. For example, Italy's Defense Minister, Fabio Fabbri, requested Italian representation in UNOSOM's II command structure, but his request was refused. (Makinda,1993, p.185)
United Nations interests and US interests were not, of course, identical. However, Somalia's experience `demonstrates the hard truth that the United Nations works only when the US leads the organization to a final conclusion. There is no multilateral system with a life and will of its own.' (Bolton,1994, p. 66)
The tragedy of Somalia raised very important questions concerning the functioning of the international system. Regional organizations were proved incapable of timely and effective intervention. Rivalries and conflicts between their members is a common phenomenon, which has as a result a lack of credibility. In addition, `they lack the expertise and operational capacity to mount either preventive measures or effective peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. The responsibility for trying to stem the tide of destruction and disaster has thus mainly devolved on the United Nations.' (Kingsbury,1994, pp. 90-91) Therefore, great issues were raised concerning the rights and obligations of the organization, the nature of its responsibility to intervene, and the capacity to carry out its duties. The case of Somalia, 8 where a complete breakdown of civil authority took place, raised questions about the United Nations' `trusteeship role'. Under this responsibility, the United Nations would have the duty of reconstructing with the help and support of the whole of international community. However, the argument against any such role would be that this role may be used as a pretext for intervening in internal affairs. Moreover, there is also a practical problem. The establishment and sustenance over time of a civil administration for recreating the civil society and rehabilitating the infrastructure, would be extremely costly, and the organization does not have its own resources, but it relies on the willingness of the member states. (Evans,1993, p.158)
`Another question being widely asked in the light of UNOSOM II is why has the United Nations been involved in this way in Somalia, when in recent times comparable suffering has been occurring on a comparable scale in comparable countries. Why was a peace enforcement operation not set in train in Rwanda? Or in Liberia? Or in the Sudan? Or in Mozambique?' (ibid, p.155)
Finally, `there are two important lessons from the Somalian experience for peacekeeping. First, peacekeeping will involve casualties and is not risk-free. Second, in order to minimize casualties while simultaneously achieving political objectives, operational techniques must be geared towards sustaining local support and maintaining impartiality. The distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement must be reasserted, and the tendency of combining the two into one operation must be rejected. (Berdal,1994, p. 43)
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